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Abstract.
In chapter one it is argued that a theorist of 
creatures who think, have beliefs, talk, etc, about 
the world, is committed by his theory to the existence 
of thoughts, beliefs, utterances, etc, and the things 
those thoughts, beliefs, utterances, etc, are about.
This claim is defended against three objections.
In the second chapter the role of semantic theories 
is investigated; a theorist, it is argued, is committed 
to a. semantic theory by his descriptions of subjects 
as saying things. From this certain constraints on 
semantic theories are deduced.
Thirdly, a number of principles governing the 
description and explanation of the experiences and 
conduct of speakers are advanced. The objectivist 
character of these principles is clarified.
The principles are then deployed in the fourth 
chapter in an attack on scepticism about our knowledge 
of other minds, with particular reference to our 
knowledge of the perceptions of others. The' attack 
contains an argument that tries to do what Wittgenstein's 
Private language Argument tried to do.
The fifth chapter attempts to make some general 
points about the description and explanation of the 
experiences and conduct of speakers. It assigns a 
central role to perception and belief, and tries to 
show that the possibility of such explanations depends 
on there being such a thing as human nature, about 
which some general remarks are made.
In the final chapter the thesis returns to the 
problem of commitments, and disputes about commitments. 
The discussion leads into the subject of realism; some 
standard elucidations of what realism is are criticised, 
and a better account drawing on material from earlier 
chanters on the explanation of belief is be^ain.
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Successive drafts of this thesis have had 
a succession of main aims. Originally it set out 
to show how a fairly rich picture of radical 
interpretation could make unattractive the 
various forms of subjectivism that have dominated 
moral philosophy for most of this century. The 
destination in ethics was then dropped as the 
thesis began to fall into two poorly connected 
halves.
That left the picture of radical interpretation, 
and a treatment of the problem of other minds that 
I hoped would help to fill in the details of the 
picture. That hore was disaonointed; it now seems 
to me that the sceptic about other minds has a lot 
to l e a m  from, and not much to teach someone who 
wants to know how radical interpretation works.
Though almost nothing has survived verbatim 
from the two or three first shots at this thesis, 
the concerns can still be recognised in the present 
version. An understanding of objectivity quite 
generally is sought for in an understanding of 
radical interpretation, where radical interpreta£-on 
is what must be possible if scepticism about our 
knowledge of other minds is unjustifiable.
It would have made many things, not least this
(5 )
preface, easier to write if there had been some 
single question to which I could have eventually 
given a yes/no answer. But the thesis is rather 
less specific and single-minded than that, and 
consequently hard to follow; I can only request 
reading it, as it was written, as a rather 
meandering exploration of objectivity.
I have many debts to acknowledge. To conversations 
with friends, particularly Margie Drake-Brockman, 
Richard Hudd and Steve Williams, who have forced 
me to think much harder about the views defended 
in this thesis. To the writings of many philosophers, 
especially Wittgenstein, Austin and Gareth Evans..
And to Mark Sainsbury who made innumerable careful 
criticisms of the last draft. But my greatest debts 
are to Tom Sorell whose endless patience with my 
views finally got me to do philosophy properly, 
and to David Wiggins for his writings and lectures 
and all the invaluable help he has given me with 
this thesis, so much so that only the lenience of 
copyright laws enables me to submit this work under 
my own. name.
These friends have done their best for me, and 
I am sorry that the thesis is so little of what 
I would like it to be that they may feel their 
help has been spumed. I can only promise to try 
in the future for better things.
G.J. Canberra,1 9 8 0 .
m
Chapter One. 'The Objects of Thought'
One. Introduction.
The aim of this chapter is to start the 
description of the situation of the radical 
interpreter. Some first guidelines are pencilled 
in, and three lines for further discussion are 
introduced. The beginnings of these three 
discussions can be traced leading out of this 
and the next chapter into and beyond the rest of 
the thesis.
Tw o . First Outlines of the Theoretical Situation; 
the Theorist, his Subjects, and their Commitments.
Any theorist who believes his ov/n theory is, 
by that token, committed to whatever entities that 
theory is committed to. To believe what m o d e m  
physics tells us, for example, is to be committed 
to at least the existence of a number of atomic 
and sub-atomic particles.
The notion of commitment used here needs at 
least the following explanation. The theorist is
committed to the truth of his rather than any rival
theory. But our interest for most of this thesis 
will be in a narrower commitment; the theorist is 
committed to the existence of whatever entities are
mentioned by the theory he believes.
Suppose now that the theorist is a psychologist 
or anthropologist (a philosopher even). He has a
T)
number of living subjects of some species or other, 
and he is interested in describing and to some extent 
explaining the experiences and conduct of these 
creatures. If his subjects are people he may have 
a special interest in their beliefs and how they 
see the part of the world they live in. He will be 
interested, in that case, in what his subjects take 
the world to consist of, and what they believe about 
those constituents of the .world.
It would be natural, and I think correct, to 
begin to represent the situation of the theorist 
as follows. Somehow or other (see later chapters) 
he comes by a description of the experiences and 
conduct of his subjects. In doing so he is likely 
(certainly advised) to attribute to them desires, 
needs, emotions, thoughts, feelings, perceptions, 
beliefs, and so on. If they speak a language he 
will attribute to them sayings, vows, and other 
writing- or speech-acts, understandings, and so 
on. These everyday psychological and linguistic 
phenomena are the objects of his first commitments 
('first’ merely in order of this exposition).
But there are more commitments that even such 
a description of such subjects will involve. Suppose 
the theorist describes some subject as believing 
that, for example, the moon is made of cheese.
Since the moon is mentioned in the specification 
of what the subject believes, the subject is, if 
he has that belief, committed to the existence of 
the moon.
(^)
Further, if the theorist believes that his 
subject has this belief about the moon, he himself 
is committed to the existence of any entities 
mentioned in his theory, in this example the moon.
For the moon is (if the subject is committed to 
its existence by believing that it is made of 
cheese) mentioned in the specification of what 
the subject is said to believe.
Thus it is natural to begin to describe the 
situation of the theorist of creatures w/ho think, 
have beliefs, talk, etc, about the world, as being 
committed by his theory to the existence of thoughts, 
beliefs, etc, and the things those thoughts, beliefs, 
etc, are about.
There are, though, three (that I shall mention) 
apparent problems with this simple position. And 
the rest of this chapter and the next will try to 
go a little way to saying something by way of 
reply to them.
(1) it may be said that from the beginning 
the dépendance of thought and the rest
on language must be acknowledged and made 
clear, and it is not in this outline.
(2) it may be said that when the theorist
claims that his subject believes that
the moon is made of cheese, he (the theorist) 
does not mention and is not committed to 
the existence of the moon.
(3) it may be said that it is not enough for
a subject to be committed to the existence
i^)
of the moon that some theorist believes 
that that subject has some belief about the 
moon. For it is only if the theorist himself 
is committed by his belief about that subject 
to the existence of the moon that the subject 
is so committed too. But then there is a 
regress. For who is to theorise about the 
theorist and his commitments? And iÉ someone 
were to what would that show?
Three. Some Theses About the Relation Between Thought 
and Language.
Thought and language are two of the things the 
beginnings of the description of whose mutual relations 
is one of the projects of this thesis. So ife* I argue 
against some views about the relation between thought 
and language this should not suggest that I do not 
believe there is any interesting relation to be 
described. To make one very weak claim towards some 
connection, it would be absurd to suppose that a 
creature incapable of understanding any language 
could have beliefs or thoughts about, for example, 
Freud's theory of dreams.
The objection I have in mind is concerned with 
the way I wrote in the outline in the last section 
as if thoughts and the rest can be attributed to 
creatures who may or may not speak any language. It 
is a popular view that thought depends on language, 
and a creature that speaks no language cannot still
ü )
have thoughts. There seem to be at least two 
possible elaborations of this claim, and it's 
worth distinguishing them.
First, it may be claimed that any theory that 
attributes thoughts to some creature must be 
committed to the existence of a theory of the 
language of the creature in question. It follows 
from the fact that this or that creature has some 
belief or thought, that it speaks a language.
Secondly, there is a stronger claim; any theory 
that attributes thoughts to some creature must 
contain a theory of the language of the creature 
in question. This claim comes very close to the 
idea criticised by Wittgenstein in the 'Investigations', 
that knowledge of a semantic theory plays an essential 
role in understanding a language.
These claims are probably both very nearly right.
And it is something of a cliche now to say that you 
only know what a man's words mean when you know what 
he believes, and only know what he believes when 
you know what his words mean. But though this cliche 
and these claims point to something important that 
we shall have to capture later, taken strictly they 
are false, and should not guide the development of 
our description of the situation of the radical. 
interpreter.
This is not the place to go into all the various 
arguments that have been used to try to establish 
these claims, nor am I the person to do it. The
I)
arguments all face the following difficulty. It 
is, I submit, reasonable to suppose that creatures 
who are competent with no language can nonetheless 
entertain a range, however limited, of thoughts, 
desires and the rest. Doubts on this point can be 
calmed by observation. And arguments to the contrary 
must identify some relevant difference between non- 
linguistic creatures and competent speakers. But 
the only genuine difference is irrelevant; the 
second speak a language while the first do not.
There is a further difficulty. It is very hard 
to prevent arguments for the idea that creatures 
who speak no language cannot think at all from , 
turning into an argument for the idea (which I 
shall pompously just dismiss as absurd) that even 
a speaker of a language cannot have a thought about 
some object unless he knows the name of the object 
(or, if not necessarily the name, some expression 
that refers to the object).
If these difficulties seem flimsy obstacles to 
the establishment of some profound truth I hope to 
get opponents on my side by incorporating in the 
course of later chapters their insights while 
avoiding what I take to be a mistake.
Four. Semantics for Propositional Attitudes.
This section is a defence of the idea, central 
to the simple outline given in Section Two, that 
in the sentence "X believes that the moon is made 
of cheese" the moon is mentioned.
This idea is intended to stand in contrast 
with Pregean theories according to which words in 
belief (and other psychological) contexts denote 
their usual senses, or themselves, or something 
other than their usual referents.
It may be enough merely to repeat an earlier 
sentence (altered a little I admit); if a subject 
is committed by some belief he has to the existence 
of the moon, then the moon must be mentioned in 
the specification of what he believes.
(in fact that's not quite right. For the existence 
of the moon may only be a condition of the existence 
of what is mentioned in the specification of his 
belief. Its existence is a condition, for example, 
of "the moon"'s having a sense. .But this alternative 
looks as if it will make it impossible for creatures 
who speak no language to have beliefs, unless they 
can be committed somehow to the sense of "the moon").
The resolution of this dispute must be sought, 
if this is not convincing, in formal semantics. A 
number of issues raised now will be settled, if at 
all, only in the next chapter when we look at 
formal theories of language and their role in 
interpretation.
The semantics to be supplied perform three 
tasks. First, since this is a thesis that speaks 
a lot about propositional attitudes,, they accomplish 
the first task of any such thesis - to supply 
semantics for the relevant area of discourse.
(iz)
Secondly, they fill a gap in the literature, and 
set the standard for rival semantic proposals. Such 
semantics should have been proposed long ago, and 
I can only suppose that ungrounded gloom about the 
possibility of homophonie semantics for propositional 
attitudes has delayed it.
Thirdly, they provide a reply to the second 
apparent problem of Section Two. I shall try to 
show that no more needs to be said about "the moon" 
as it occurs in "X believes that the moon is made 
of cheese" than whatever needs to be said to explain 
what it means or does in "the moon is made of cheese". 
Given that, and that the moon is mentioned in "the 
moon is made of cheese", I think we can infer that 
the moon is mentioned in "X believes that the moon 
is made of cheese".
The semantics to be supplied meet Tarski's 
Convention T, and I shall assume that they are 
part of a larger theory done in the style of Tarski's 
original theory of truth. Further discussion of 
issues here occurs in the next chapter.
"X believes that" is a phrase that takes 
sentences to form sentences. It takes, for example, 
the sentence "the moon is made of cheese" to form 
another sentence "X believes that the moon is made 
of cheese". Suppose we have a language (a fragment 
of English) that contains among other things 
the sentence "the moon is made of cheese", and 
a theory 0^ of that meets Convention T. We add 
to the operator "X believes that" and wish to
(ill)
supplement 0^ to cope with this addition.
We take our cue from the semantics for another 
sentential operator "it is not the case that". The 
usual semantics for this operator consist of the 
following axiom, or something like it;
(A.l) (Vp)("It is not the case that"-p is
true iff it is not the case that
p is true).
I shall criticise this axiom in the next 
chapter. Here let me just introduce what seems to 
be a perfectly good alternative, one immune to the 
objection to be rehearsed later.
(A.2) (Vp)(YS)("It is not the case that"-p
is true iff (f-g (p is true iff S) 
& it is not the^case that S)).
@2 is the theory consisting of 0^ plus (A.2).
And @2 will meet Convention T for a language that 
comprises of and the operator "it is not the 
case that".
Analogously, to deal with L2 (ie. the language 
consisting of plus the operator "X believes that") 
we add to the following axiom;
(A.3) (Vp)(VS)("X believes that"-p is true
iff (kggfP is true iff S)
& den("%"") believes that S)).
Here @2 is the theory consisting of plus 
(A.3). Again, @2 will meet Convention T; we can 
prove, for example, given that den("X") is X and
that hû ("the moon is made of cheese" is true iff 
^2
the moon is made of cheese), the required theorem
I \ L )
The difficulty is a familiar one. A subject 
and a theorist can only have beliefs that involve 
the moon if the moon exists. People do not for 
this reason have beliefs about Zeus or Atlantis; 
these names, as Frege put it, only behave, or are 
used, as if they denoted something.
Perhaps this difficulty will become clearer 
if we try to solve it. It is not enough for some 
subject to be committed to the existence of Zeus 
that some theorist uses that name from stories to 
describe him as having some belief about Zeus.
But it is both necessary and sufficient for some 
subject to be committed to the existence of the 
moon that any theorist who does his job properly 
describes him as having some belief about the 
moon.
To put the point another way, it is a"sufficient 
condition of some subject's not being committed ' 
to the existence of an object that some theorist 
can describe that subject's beliefs without ever 
mentioning that object. This condition is also 
necessary.
The importance of this point, for the purposes 
of this thesis at least, cannot be overestimated. 
Just what the point is may still be obscure but 
perhaps it will be recognised in the claims of 
later chapters (especially Chapter Three).
My use of various words in this section has
04)
that "X believes that the moon is made of cheese" 
is true iff X believes that the moon is made of 
cheese. (The proof is trivial.)
These semantics can easily be adapted to deal 
with propositional attitudes other than belief.
Pending the discovery of some flaw in these 
semantics, and the development of a decent 
alternative treatment (along Pregean lines, maybe)
I conclude that the moon is mentioned in the 
assertion that X believes that the moon is made 
of cheese.
In that case both the theorist who believes 
that X believes that the moon is made of cheese, 
and the subject who has the belief attributed by 
the theorist, are committed to the existence of 
the moon.
Five. Some Remarks About Existence.
An oversimplification in the statement of the 
last paragraph should now be remedied, and the 
difficulty alleged by problem (3) of section two 
now dealt with.
If a theorist claims that a subject believes 
that the moon is made of cheese, he and the subject 
are only committed to the existence of the moon 
by that claim if the theorist is; only if, we 
might rather unhelpfully add, a theorist of the 
theorist (which is what I suopose I am) claims 
that the theorist believes his subject has this 
belief.
been guided by the principle that one cannot 
think about, talk about, have beliefs about, or 
be committed to the existence of what does not 
exist. This use is unnatural, and makes for a 
lot of difficulties in the construction of 
alternatives to natural use.
The principle is none the worse for that. But 
it would have aided expression and comprehension 
if there had gone before some semantic theory for 
non-denoting terms that made clear, consistently 
with the above principle, their role or function 
in psychological contexts. Such semantics, if the 
principle is correct and my use of psychological 
words in accordance with the principle as unnatural 
as I find it, can be supplied, though I have only 
the faintest inkling (conferred by lectures given 
by Gareth Evans) of how to supply them. I 'trust 
though that I shall in most of the remainder of 
the thesis be talking about things that do exist, 
and that the omission of semantics for non-denoting 
terms will not be responsible for too many future 
obscurities of thought or expression.
(lg)
Chapter Two. 'Formal Theories of Language'.
One. Introduction.
This is a complicated chapter. Its purpose 
is to develop a little further our understanding 
of what it is for a theorist to be committed 
to the existence of various objects. This is 
done by bringing semantic theories into the 
picture.
Our attention will be turned to the problem
of what it is for a semantic theory to be
/
'adequate'. Successive attempts to deal with 
this problem are prompted by a number of ideas 
about what semantic theories are.
At the same time, some complaints are made 
against two kinds of possible semantic theory, 
which I call 'translational' and 'list' theories. 
The inadequacies of these theories are deduced 
from our final account of what it is for a 
semantic theory to be 'adequate'.
Two. The Commitments of Theorist and Subjects; 
First Improvements.
The theorist, we shall suppose, has arrived 
at a description of the experiences and conduct 
of his subjects. This description is given in 
his language (which, as before, we call I^), a 
language with the resources to talk about things
in the world and the thoughts, beliefs, etc, 
that his subjects have about those things.
As we have said, the theorist is committed 
by his description to the existence of any 
objects mentioned in the description.
We introduce semantic theories into the 
picture with the following thought: semantics 
is the study of the relation between language 
and the world, and a semantic theory for a 
language must describe the relation between that 
language and the world. Further, if that language 
has the resources to speak about things in the 
world, it will be the first duty of a semantic 
theory for that language to describe those 
resources. It will do that by indicating what 
things the language is capable of speaking 
about.
If this much is true of semantic theories 
we can take our first step towards improving 
our understanding of commitment. We can say 
that the theorist is committed by his description 
to the existence of any objects mentioned in 
an adequate semantic theory of the language 
used to give the description.
'Adequacy* is now the name of the problem.
For our understanding of what .semantic theories 
are limits us to this explanation of what it 
is for a semantic theory to be adequate;
(R.l): A semantic theory for a language L
is adequate iff it mentions all the
things to which users of L are 
committed by their use of L.
And that, it hardly needs saying, reverses any 
advancement we may have thought we had made 
with our improved statement of what it is for 
a theorist to be committed to the existence of 
various objects.
Three. Two Sorts of Redundant Theories; and Two 
Preliminary Complaints Against Them.
What we need to do is to find a way of 
saying what semantic theories are that will let 
us replace (R.l). We will then have to try to. 
show that any theory that meets the new 
requirement will also meet (R.l).
In this section I consider two kinds of 
semantic theory. The first, which I shall call a 
'translational* theory, does not meet (R.l); 
and we will try to show later that a complaint 
we shall make against it is a serious complaint. 
The second I call 'list theories'; such theories 
do meet (R.l) but again we shall make a complaint 
against them whose seriousness will only emerge 
later.
A translational theory (as advertised and" 
advocated by such people as Katz) is supposed 
to deliver, for each sentence of the language 
in question, a sentence with the same meaning.
The most conspicuous feature of such a theory 
is that both sentences will be quoted, as in
( z \ )
(T.l): "La neige est blanche" means the
same as "Snow is white".
The only entities mentioned in such theories 
are sentences, so they are not adequate by the 
lights of (R.l).
We might also point out that translational 
theories are vulnerable to a different complaint. 
Someone could know a translational theory for 
a language (French, in our example) and yet not 
thereby know what the sentences of that language 
meant. For he might not understand the translating 
language (English) either.
If we are to get any mileage from this complaint, 
by using it instead of (R.l) as an explanation 
of what it is for a semantic theory to be adequate, 
we need to understand why it is a complaint. We 
need to know (unless we just want to assert it) 
why an adequate semantic theory must be such that 
anyone who knows the theory will understand the 
language of which it is a theory.
We will arrive at some understanding of this 
in the fifth section. But the other task of the 
present section is only to make a complaint 
against 'list theories'.
Such theories consist of a list of statements, 
one for each sentence of the language, of the 
following sort;
(T.2): "La neige est blanche" means that
snow is white,
"L'herbe est vert" means that grass
IS green, 
etc.
In the end a list theory will, as required by 
(R.l), mention everything to which speakers of 
the language in question (French, again) are, by 
their use of the language, committed.
But no-one impressed with the work of Frege 
and Tarski who thought he detected something- 
interesting in (R.l) will let list theories pass 
the test set by (R.l) without demur. What was 
meant by a theory that mentions the objects of 
users' commitments was a theory (in the style of 
Frege or Tarski) that contained such information 
as the following;
(T.3): "La neige" refers to snow,
"L'herbe" refers to grass, 
etc.
Rather than try to modify (R.l) to exclude 
list theories, we shall look for a reason to 
ignore them. The reason will be this; they depend 
(in a way to be explained) on what I shall call 
'Formal Theories', in the style of (T.3).
Suppose that someone were to say that list 
theories were the only kind of semantic theory 
that we can have. Then the question we should 
put to him is the following; 'By what principle 
is the set of sentences of a language whose 
meanings are listed by a list theory determined?' 
If you were constructing a list theory, how would 
you know when to stop?'
Lzi)
The correct answer would be 'The set of 
sentences of a language is determined by a theory 
of meaning for the language. I come to the end of 
the list when I have given the meaning of each 
meaningful sentence of the language'. But this 
answer is no good to the list theorist, for he 
has no principled theory of meaning or way of 
deciding whether or not a sentence is meaningful.
The difficulty for the list theorist is 
aggravated by the fact, crucial to our discussion, 
that speakers can construct and understand new 
or original sentences, ones they have never heard 
before. So it will not do either for the list 
theorist merely to deal with each sentence as it 
is spoken by someone; his job, and his theory, will 
never be complete.
(It will be said that what is needed is a 
syntax. Rather than go off on a long and poorly 
informed digression, I shall simply assert that 
syntax just is semantics; the view, almost universal 
in Chomsky's heyday but now, I believe, almost 
defunct, that decisions about syntactic well- 
formedness can be made independantly of semantic 
considerations is testified against by every work 
of every syntactician. Well-formedness is just 
meaningfulness, and if it were not who would care 
about syntax? I shall retract this assertion when I see 
syntax done as an independant discipline.)
I shall give the discussion the push it needs
by concluding at a slightly premature stage 
that if a language is such that speakers of 
that language can construct and understand 
new and original sentences, then there must 
be some (formal) theory other than a list 
theory for that language. Further, this other 
theory will have what it takes to be a list 
theory, so we can ignore list theories for 
such languages.
Doubtless this is the place to say that 
such an other theory will be a formal theory 
in the mould of a Pregean or Tarskian theory 
of truth, or, if not that, will proceed by 
showing how the meanings of the sentences it 
counts as belonging to the language depend 
on the meanings of their words and the way 
those words are put together. Such an assertion 
seems to me unexceptionable, and I have no 
qualms about my use of this framework in the 
semantics for propositional attitudes of Chapter 
One; but it is of course provisional on the 
failure, in which I have every confidence, of 
opponents of Frege and Tarski to provide on 
paper a working alternative.
There is one minor contribution we can make 
to these technical matters on our way past. It 
is this; a formal theory, if it is to avoid the 
risk of triviality or ineffectiveness, should not
(Z5)
use the name of the language for which it purports 
to be a theory. The ease with which
(T.4): (Vp)(if ”p” is a sentence of L, then
”p” means that p)
seems to avoid the difficulties of list theories 
is wholly illusory. Equally, the essential (if 
inexplicit) reference to L in the standard axiom 
for negation must be replaced (as it is in (A.2) of 
Chapter One) by reference to the formal theory 
(for L).
Four. The Replacement of (R.l).
A semantic theory describes the relation between 
language and the world. This thought lies behind 
(R.l), and if we are to replace (R.l) we must 
replace this thought.
One attempt at replacement has already been 
criticised. This was the idea (to adapt it to our 
present purposes) that a semantic theory is what 
must exist if a creature has a thought. But we 
were not convinced that language is a condition 
of thought.
(The deficiencies of this idea are also 
deficiencies with rival semantic proposals to 
(A.3) of Chapter One. For example, if we doubt 
the suggestion that thought depends on language 
we will doubt that in
(A.4) (Vp)(VS)("% believes that"-p is true
(U)
iff (l-n (p is true iff S)
& den("X” ) believes that 
"S" is true))
the condition is necessary. I doubt that it 
is sufficient either.)
We shall find our way to a replacement for 
(R.l) with the following strategy. Let us just 
say that a semantic theory is a theory of a 
language, and then allow some, observations 
about language to illuminate what such a theory 
must be like.
I shall try to deduce some constraints on 
the adequacy of a semantic theory from the 
observation (which I shall treat as uncontroversial) 
that language is a means of communication. More 
precisely (though leaving out writing etc) 
speakers can use the words of their language 
to say things. The first thing we need is the 
connection between using words and saying 
something, given by the principle
(P.l) (Vp)(X says that p iff
(3S)(3 9)(hg(”S” means that p)
& X uses the words "S")).
It is a fact of considerable importance to 
us that language is a means of communication..
Most of our interaction with other people is via 
language, and we are extremely fond of the idea 
that the interaction works. So if (P.l) captures 
something of that thought, then failure to 
capture that thing will be an inadequacy in any
semantic theory.
What would a theory 9 have to be like if 
(P.l) were true? The idea behind (P.l) is that 
if someone uses the words ”S" (suppose he says 
"La neige est blanche") and thereby says that p 
(that snow is white) then "S" must mean that p.
And the theorems of a theory for a language 
whose words people use to say things must be 
such that the sentence of the language mentioned 
by the theorem ("S") must be translated by the 
sentence used by the theorem to say what uses 
of the sentence mean.
For a language that is a means of communication, 
then, if (P.l) is true we can say
(R.2); A semantic theory for a language L
is adequate iff it has as consequences, 
for each sentence of L and ho others, 
a theorem of the form
such that "p" translates "S'".
Five. The Replacement of (R.2), and Two Complaints 
Revisited.
vVe have got a replacement for (R.l) from 
our observation that language is a means of 
communication. Other and no doubt more interesting 
requirements can be derived from other and 
more interesting observations. For to account 
for the ways in which language can be a means
(Zô)
of communication is only one aim of semantic 
theories.
Eyebrows (even blood pressures) may have 
been raised earlier when I accorded similar 
treatments to negation and belief. It will 
be up to a complete semantic theory to account 
for the very different properties of these 
two operators. The extensionality of negation 
contexts will be a first problem. I only wish 
to point out that these problems are not problems 
for the theorist who confines himself to meeting 
(R.2), as I did.
Two tasks remain for this chapter. First, . 
we shall tackle the problem that has exercised 
many philosophers for some time of replacing 
(R.2) by a constraint that does not use the 
concept of translation. Secondly we shall try 
to derive from within this framework our 
earlier complaints against translational and 
list theories.
If speakers use a language to say things, 
then there is a theory 9 for L that meets (R.2), 
if (P.l) can be believed. So if a theorist 
describes speakers as saying things in some 
language L he commits himself to the existence 
of such a theory of L.
It would be nice simply to be able to say 
that a theory for a language L is adequate iff 
a theorist of L-speakers is committed by- his 
description of those speakers to the existence
of that theory. (If they speak no language, he is 
of course committed to no such theory.)
The thought needs some work before it will be 
of any use to us. For as it stands the obvious 
line of development is to say that the theorist's 
description must be such that the theory of L 
to which he is thereby committed must be adequate 
by the standard of (R.l).
But it has an important point in its favour.
For it has moved us from talking about the theory 
of (the theorist's language) to talking about 
the theory of the speakers' language, L. And to 
turn this to our advantage we need only find some 
way of saying what the theorist's description 
must be like if the theory of L to which he is 
thereby committed is to be adequate. We shall then 
find a way to return to talking about the theorist's 
language.
The main task is easily begun. We might begin 
it by observing that language is only a part, 
however central and important, of the world to 
which speakers respond and with which they involve 
themselves. Semantics, then, is only a part of a 
larger task of describing the whole variety of 
experiences and actions (linguistic and otherwise) 
of the speakers of L. And we should add, to try 
to rule out trivial descriptions, that the description 
must make sense of, illuminate or explain all these 
experiences and actions and what they have to do 
with language and the meanings of sentences.
(20)
The right question to press now is this;
'What is it for a description to make sense of, 
or explain or illuminate all these experiences 
and actions?' It would be nice if we could give 
necessary and sufficient conditions for ' makes 
sense of (explains, illuminates) S^' where 
can be any sentence describing an experience or 
action. B^ ,t this thesis will not go very far 
to supplying such conditions. It will be concerned, 
in later chapters, with a more informal provision 
of some details of what the description must be 
like. These details will be concerned with making 
unattractive the opinion, held by many, that the 
project of supplying such a description.is just 
impossible.
But that is for later. Let us pause here to 
record our replacement, such as it is, for (R.2);
( R . 3 )  A semantic theory for a language L  
is adequate iff a theorist of L- 
speakers is committed to that theory 
by a description of L-speakers that 
makes sense of, makes intelligible, 
or explains the total experiences 
and conduct of L-speakers.
\
I submit that it is a fairly interesting and 
substantial and open question whether or not a 
theory adequate by the lights of ( R . 3 )  is also 
adequate by the lights of (R.2) and therefore (R.l) 
And it seems to me that it will be. For there is 
no making sense of speakers without describing 
what those speakers say to each other, and then
11^
(p.l) and the argument of the last section 
can be used to show that making sense of 
speakers commits the theorist to a theory of 
their language that will meet (R.2).
It is then a simple matter to show that 
such a theory will also meet (R.l). For since 
a theory that meets (R.2) must say, for each 
sentence of the language what that sentence 
means, it would not be possible to know the 
theory and yet be unable to understand the 
language of which it is a theory. Our complaint 
against the translational theories that fail 
(R.l) thus becomes the complaint that they 
do not perform the essential task of a semantic 
theory of explaining how language is a means 
of communication.
It is also a simple matter to return from 
talk of his subjects’ language L to the theorist's 
language L2 ; let L be I g , and therefore let the 
speakers of L include the theorist (theorising 
now^ about himself and other speakers of his 
language). The commitments of speakers and 
theorist now coincide, and these commitments, 
if is rich enough to perform the descriptive 
task in front of it, will be quite substantial.
I cannot quite calm the suspicion that a 
large circle has now been closed. But perhaps 
we can register the following improvement in 
our position. 7/e began by talking about the
in')
commitments that flow from a theorist’s 
description of his subjects. Now we are looking 
rather at the commitments that flow from the 
semantic theory for the language used to give 
the description. The clarification of these 
commitments, insofar as clarification is even 
possible, rests with the description as before; 
but our interest in the description can now be 
for its own sake (and will be in subsequent 
chapters) and can be pursued obliviously of how 
the commitments that go with it are forced on 
the theorist. They can now be left until the 
end.
Finally, I offer what is only a sketch of a 
way to derive from (R.3) an understanding of 
the inadequacy of list theories. For simple 
languages there may be no inadequacy, but for 
a language like Lg, reputedly rich enough to 
cope with all the contingencies of the description 
of human life, we can insist on the following.
Such languages must be able to describe 
new and unforseen events. There is no way to 
provide in advance of experience a closed and 
manageable handful of formulae adequate to the 
task of reporting the experiences and conduct 
of people. Perhaps footballers really are always 
either over the moon or as sick as parrots; more 
likely, as the joke goes, i t ’s not history that 
repeats itself but historians.
The task of a semantic theory, then, is to
(J2)
describe a language capable of describing a 
world, and people in the world, subject to 
constant change and variety. Of course, alongside 
this continual change and need for new thoughts 
there must be, if a semantic theory is to stay 
true for any length of time, some constancy or 
regularity or familiarity.
But a' list theory will always be on the 
move, if it to keep up with the constant novelty 
and invention of the descriptions of speakers. 
Only a formal theory will be able to rest on 
its laurels awarded by the world’s constant 
features, to explain for some decent stint 
how speakers are able to contrive and understand 
sentences about the world’s continual efforts 
to perplex, surprise and entertain them.
(3^i)
Chapter Three. ’Description and Explanation.’
One. Introduction.
The present chapter is aimed at making a 
few simple points about explanation in general.
This will help us to understand what it is for 
a theorist’s description of his subjects to 
make sense of their experiences and conduct.
It will also prepare the ground for the discussion 
in the chapters that follow of the so-called 
’Problem of Other Minds’.
Two. Some Principles of Explanation.
The theorist is engaged in describing, in 
as illuminating and explanatory a way as .possible, 
the experiences and conduct of his subjects.
I shall propose two simple principles about 
explanations, but their import and utility may 
be obscure until we have looked at an example 
illustrating and partly defending those principles.
The principles are quite general; no restriction 
to the explanation of experience or conduct is 
intended.
Suppose, then, that the theorist is after 
an explanation of the fact that S. The best 
explanation, whether or not he knows what it is, 
will consist of a number of facts that explain
(35)
why S. We are going to be interested in the 
relationship between the fact that S and these 
explanatory facts. A principle, derived from 
Harman, tells us that
(P.2): If the fact that p is an essential
part of the best explanation of 
why S, then "p" is true iff "S" is 
true.
Clarification and defence of this, such as there 
will be in this thesis, is limited to the example 
to be given shortly. (But (P.2) should not need 
more than this; it is, I think, hardly more than 
an improvement on just saying that "p" explains. 
"3" iff "S" confirms "p". Anyone suspicious of 
talk of facts here should translate into talk of 
sentences.)
We add a second principle that explains what 
it is for the fact that p to be an essential part 
of the best explanation of why S;
(P.3): The fact that p is an essential part 
of the best explanation of why S 
iff the best explanation cannot fix
the sense of "S" without the help of
the fact that p.
This is likely to be more obscure or implausible, 
but largely because it may be rather poorly 
stated. My hope is that it is quite trivial; the
example that follows is meant to show that it is
just that. (Some will find the appearance of 
the concept of meaning a sign that we are indeed
] 6 )
busy with trivia, undoing all the good work that 
(R.3)’s taking over from (R.2) represented.)
It may help, before we look at the example to 
try to fix the sense of "fix the sense" with the 
following thought. We can explain the meaning of 
a sentence by telling someone who does not know 
what it means the conditions under which it would 
be true. One way to do this would be to cite 
circumstances that would lead to, and explain, 
the truth of the sentence.
The example that follows has nothing much to 
do with experience or conduct, since focus on the 
principles is essential and liable to be blurred 
by anything more interesting.
Through the property of West Hill Golf Club 
in Surrey there runs a stream (treacherous only 
to golfers). The stream is, to give you a rough 
idea, a strange reddish-brown. And this colour 
was explained to me as discolouration of the stream 
by rust from the nails of an alarming number of 
coffins as it flows through the adjacent grounds 
of Brookwood cemetery.
Investigation could help to decide the truth 
of this speculation. For us its truth does not 
matter; we need note only two things. -
First, it might be that the only thing within 
the ambit of the stream capable of turning that 
stream that reddish-brown is indeed rust from 
nails of the coffins. In that case the suggested 
explanation would be the best explanation (not
least because it would be the only possible 
explanation). And the fact that the stream is 
that colour would confirm that rust was getting 
into the water.
Secondly, it may be true but irrelevant that 
rust is getting into the stream. The amount might 
be so slight that discolouration due to rust alone 
might be indétectable. The relevant fact could be 
that the stream was loaded with brick dust, and 
in that case the remarks of the last paragraph will 
apply to this explanation instead.
(There are other cases; there might be no rust 
at all in the stream, or the colour might be due 
to half rust and half brick dust, etc. These cases 
add nothing to our discussion.)
The second point is the more important of the 
two. There could be rust in the stream yet this 
fact be irrelevant to explaining that colour, or 
of no help in saying what colour the stream is.
It will be irrelevant, according to (P.3), just 
in case it contributes nothing to our understanding 
of the colour of the stream. (That a stream is 
contaminated by minute quantities of rust does 
not suggest that it is a reddish-brown.) Only the 
best explanation correctly fixes the sense of 
"The stream is reddish-brown", and this can't 
be done in the second case without the help of 
the fact that the stream is full of brick dust.
Perhaps the principles will still feel wrong,
but I suspect that so far this example shows 
nothing so clearly as that the elucidation of 
truisms can be very laborious. (I apologise for 
any uncertainty that may remain about the meaning 
of (P.2) or (P.3), and request understanding them 
in the way nearest to tautology.)
Let us now suppose that the explanation of 
the colour of the stream is a matter of some interest 
and controversy. Let us also suppose that the stream 
is more precisely described as being the colour of 
a stream contaminated by a substantial amount of 
rust. Rival theorists are agreed that this is as 
good a description as any, but they propose different 
explanations of the colour that we shall divide 
into three categories;
(1) substantial amounts of rust are getting 
into the stream (from the cemetery)
(2) substantial amounts of iron oxide are 
getting into the stream (from the cemetery)
(3) brick dust/blood/paint/some red chemical 
other than rust/etc is getting into the 
stream (from somewhere).
If it is clear that only one of these explantions 
can fix the sense of "the stream is the reddish- 
brovm of a stream contaminated by substantial 
amounts of rust" then the controversy will be over 
before it has started. (But I have chosen what 
seem to be plausible alternatives; pollution by 
cobalt salts would not be plausible since this 
explanation would suggest that the stream was
blue, and would not fix the sense of "S".)
If, on the other hand, all these explanations 
are capable of correctly fixing the sense of the 
precise description of the colour of the stream,
then the issue will turn to which of them is
true. And we will have a number of equally good 
ways of describing the colour of the stream; the 
stream will be the reddish-brown of a stream 
contaminated by
(1) substantial amounts of rust
(2) substantial amounts of iron oxide
(3) this or that amount of brick dust/blood/ 
paint/etc.
In general, given a description of some 
phenomenon, it will always be the first problem 
for explanations of category (3) to show that 
they can correctly fix the sense of the description. 
In thé case of explanations of category (3) this 
will involve showing that (in our case) the colour 
of a stream with rust in it is the same as the 
colour of a stream with brick dust (blood, etc) 
in it. In the case of explanations of category
(2) it will have to be shown that those explanations 
really are of category (2) not (3); in our case 
this will mean showing that rust just is iron 
oxide.
The significance of all this may be in its 
infancy. We shall begin to see it more clearly 
when we look at a more interesting case. This 
will allow us to consider the possibility that
(ao)
the original description of what has to be 
explained has no clear sense. The absurdity of 
supposing that there is no such thing as rust 
prevents continuation with the present example.
Three. An Example Involving Aesthetic Beliefs.
Suppose that someone, looking at a painting, 
comes by the belief that the painting is visibly 
beautiful. We shall suppose that this is 
outstandingly the unique best description of his 
belief.
Explanations of the belief fall into three 
categories, as before;
(1) the painting is visibly beautiful
(2) the painting is visibly highly commendable
(or choose your own synonym for "beautiful")
(3) the painting is realistic/colourful/by
Titian/of a nude/large/religious/etc and 
he likes/is moved by/has been conditioned 
to prefer/associates with his mother/etc 
realistic/colourful/etc paintings.
Explanations like (l) have often been regarded 
with suspicion. So-called 'values' have been 
denounced as nothing more than a matter of taste 
or opinion, or conditioning; and those suspicious 
of (1) have sought to replace its occurences 
everywhere by an explanation in the mould of (3).
On the success of such exceptionless replacement
of (1) depends the idea that there are no 'values'
of which we are aware; the idea, that is, that 
either there are no such values or even if there
are we do not know them.
But that success itself depends on the ability 
of explanations in the mould of (3) to correctly 
fix the sense of claims such as "He believes that 
the painting is beautiful". For only if explanations 
such as (3) can explain such beliefs properly can 
we entertain the idea that the beauty of things 
plays no role in our beliefs, and is not needed 
to explain those beliefs.
Two things must be made clear. First, the 
options in (3) are not reductions of (l). They 
are not equivalent to each other nor are they 
equivalent to (l); as anyone who knows what beauty 
is knows, a realistic painting that people like 
need not be a beautiful painting, and vice versa.
And, of course, those who defend the idea that 
we are not aware of beauty had better steer clear 
of equating beauty with such properties as the 
property of being realistic and liked by people 
(for this is not what beauty is, and it is a 
property that we clearly are aware of).
Secondly, it won't help a defender of the 
objectivity of beauty to pretend that explanations 
like those in (3) cannot fix properly the senses 
of descriptions of our aesthetic beliefs (or 
whatever such explanations rival*with (l) to explain) 
For i t ’s clear that people do sometimes come by 
such beliefs about beauty precisely for the rather 
poor reasons that (3). begins to list.
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But there is a question that the objectivist 
can press on his opponents, and it is one that 
I think they cannot answer. The objectivist's 
own answer will lead us towards a new principle 
to add to (p.2) and (P.3).
The question the objectivist must ask those 
suspicious of (1) is this; ’What, on your view, 
ensures that, or explains why explanations such 
as those of (3) do really fix properly the senses 
of our beliefs about beauty? And what, on your view, 
would be wrong with explaining someone’s belief 
that a painting was beautiful by saying (for 
instance) that it portrayed, in a corner of the 
canvass, an object whose name rhymes with the name 
of something he had for lunch?'
The subjectivist is here asked for a way of 
determining what explanations can fix the senses 
of our beliefs about beauty; and he is asked to 
make it clear that those explanations will really 
fix those senses.
I doubt that any answer is available. We can 
see this by looking at the objectivist answer, 
and seeing what room there might be for an 
alternative. The objectivist answer is most clearly 
stated in two parts;
(i) people have a number of reactions to the 
beauty of things that are beautiful
(ii) an explanation "p" of someone's belief 
that an object X is beautiful correctly 
fixes the sense of the belief iff it 
explains reactions of that person that
( 4 3 )
would (otherwise) be explained by the 
fact that X is beautiful.
It would be interesting to go into what the 
reactions that (i) tries to delimit would be. Our 
best clues are from (3); they plausibly include, 
if the examples of (3) are decent alternatives 
to (l), such reactions as liking the object, 
being moved by it, preferring it to others, 
associating it with things held dear, and so on.
And beauty, we can say, just is the property 
that some objects have to evoke such reactions.
It is crucial to the objectivism of the 
answer just given that characterising these 
reactions uses, and cannot do without using the 
concept of beauty. Or rather, it's crucial that 
specifying what explanations can be said to fix 
the senses of beliefs about beauty must use the 
concept of beauty.
The answer just given has the additional 
virtue that it makes clear why the explanations 
so delimited do really explain our beliefs. We 
can say that someone who thinks that an object 
is beautiful does so because he reacts (and, if 
he knows what beauty is, knows that he has reacted) 
to that object in a way that he would react to 
a beautiful object. The object to which he 
reacts in this way need not be beautiful if 
plausible alternatives from (3) are available, 
which they'may not always be.
How could this objectivism be avoided?
A subjectivist must find a way to replace all 
references to beauty in (i) and (ii), much as 
he replaces (1) by (3). But what, if not the 
concept of beauty, could he use? And what, if 
not the concept of beauty, is to guide this 
replacement? What would be wrong with replacing 
"the fact that X is beautiful" in (ii) with 
"the fact that X depicts something whose name 
rhymes with 'veal'"?
That this problem crops up in the same form 
for the subjectivist shows that the objectivist's 
answer is a good one, for an objactivist's 
purposes anyway. There seem to be two alternatives 
for the subjectivist. He can either use some 
concept, inspired by (3) that he considers 
equivalent to beauty', about which he is prepared 
to be an objectivist, or he can say that any 
replacement for the references to beauty in (i) 
and (ii) will be as good as any other replacement.
The first of these is clearly no good to 
a subjectivist. The second shows that there is 
no such thing as beauty, but in a rather unexpected 
way.
If it doesn't matter which of a number of 
different concepts you use to explain what counts 
as having a belief that something is beautiful, 
this can only be because the concept of beauty 
is obscure to the point of being vacuous. For 
"beautiful" would mean anything you care to think 
of; it will be no surprise then to find that we
[U S )
are never aware of beauty if there is nothing in 
the least determinate for us to be aware of.
It may (just conceivably) be that "beautiful" 
is a vacuous word. But anyone who doubts that what 
someone had for lunch could have much to do with 
what things he finds beautiful will doubt that there 
is no principle behind what can and what cannot count 
as an explanation of someone’s belief about beauty.
Our conclusion mirrors, and helps to clarify 
the rationale for the principle of Chapter One that 
one cannot think, have beliefs, etc (in the strict 
sense in which belief and thought etc are things 
that have a certain sort of explanation which we 
are now looking at and trying to formulate principles 
about) about what does not exist. A general principle, 
that makes this reasonably clear, can be added to 
our first two principles;
(P.4): If "S" has a clear sense, then an
explanation "p" of A ’s belief that S • 
correctly fixes the sense of that belief
iff it explains reactions he has which
are reactions that would be explained 
by the fact that S if A perceived that S.
It may be obscure, now that this principle 
has been made general, what these reactions are 
meant to be. Clarification in particular cases will 
come from explanations, insofar as we can think 
of them, from category (3). And to the extent 
that we feel that membership of that category
I
is governed by something (the meaning of "S")
we can be assured that there are such reactions
t.n bp clarified. For if there were no such reactions 
then T doubt that there could be such a thing as 
the belief that S; it is only if the fact that 
S engages with us somehow, or imninves on us with 
detectable significance, that there can be such 
a thing as the belief that S. (Writers on the role 
of causality in belief have given these points a 
clarity that may be lacking here; further remarks 
on the subject occur later in the thesis.)
Four. Two Remarks on the Possibility of Knowledge.
(P.4) is intended to encourage a mild optimism 
about the rossibility of knowledge. Where there is 
a belief there must be the nossibility of seeing 
whether or not the belief is true, unless something 
prevents nerception. T shall make one remark to 
further egg on this optimism, and one that will 
prevent it from going too far.
It is easy to find some alternative to the 
fact that S when we are looking for an explanation 
of some belief, ray belief, for example, that there 
is a typewriter before my eyes. Other people are 
better than I am at thinking up such alternatives.
It is even easier to imagine that there is no 
end to the checking of these alternatives, for 
each alternative has itself a number of possible 
errlanations, and so on.
Thp first remark is this. What counts as 
relevant to the exnlanatjon of some rhenomenon 
cannot be the states of the whole world since its 
beginning. To dig up the origins of some state
(Lf>)
of affairs of which I claim present awareness 
must be in the rather short run to change the 
subject. Disputes are certainly settled only by 
looking beyond the point of disagreement to 
connected issues, but to follow these connections 
too far is to lose sight of the starting point 
and the reason for the excursion. And if someone 
continues to disagree no matter what relevant 
facts are put before him, and continues to point 
to things further and further from the issue and 
to pretend that nothing relevant has yet been 
shown to him, we can only suprose that he holds 
his first thought above what can be learned from 
careful attention to detail.
In one way then we can say that controversy 
that is properly chaired could always be settled, 
and agreement reached. But if one had to have one's 
philosophy in a sentence of comprehensible length 
it would be hard to beat the thought that the 
world may be deeper than investigation; a man cannot 
expect to be always able to check the truth or 
falsity of a claim he chooses to check (starting 
with no more than his understanding of that claim). 
And there is no argument that has ever worked to 
show that the world is only as deep as a man's arm 
is long and cannot escape his grasp.
It always needs arguing, in the face of the 
optimism that the first remark above was meant 
to encourage, that this or that sentence is one
(u.D
whose truth we cannot know. Heisenberg and others 
are responsible for arguments that have persuaded 
people of unknowability in physics, arithmetic, 
and perhaps elsewhere. On a more provincial and 
personal level we must also mention the limitations 
of being men and living now; much of the past is 
beyond our recovery, and most places in the 
universe will have to wait for others to examine. 
Even such mundane factors as boredom must affect 
our chances of, for example, counting up all the 
ants in the world. Perhaps, too, the diversity 
of what is needed to appreciate Mozart, on the 
one hand, and the Sex Pistols on the other, is
more than any man could compress into a single
skull, so that the conjunction of their virtues 
must be beyond any man's verification.
These last two paragraphs comprise the second 
remark of this section. And we shall return to 
these issues armed with what we shall l e a m  from 
our discussion of our knowledge of other people, 
and attempt to use these flimsy instruments in 
a more precise statement of this second remark.
I have made the remark now for two reasons. 
First, it includes the claim that it must be the 
sceptic about the possibility of some piece of .
knowledge who must confront the naive optimism we
spawned by the first remark with an argument 
against that possibility.
More importantly, it warns us against hoping 
for too much from the argument against the sceptic
about other minds. The argument will consist 
mainly of applications of the principles of this 
chapter to the sceptic’s claims. Some progress 
with the project of improving and adding to these 
principles, thereby improving our account of 
( R . 3 )  and commitment, will be made. But at no 
point should we expect our project of describing 
people and their place in the world to enable us 
to argue that scepticism is wrong because there 
is nothing we cannot know.
With these thoughts in mind let us turn to 
scepticism about other minds, and the impossibility 
that has been alleged so often of even starting 
the project required by ( R . 3 )  whose guiding 
principles we have begun to clarify in this 
chapter.
(so)
Chapter Pour. 'Other Minds: Part One.'
One. Introduction.
The treatment of the problem of our knowledge 
of other minds will be in two parts. The first 
part, which occupies this chapter, will be a 
sustained and all-out attack on scepticism. In 
the next chapter we will try to demonstrate some 
of the insights that sceptics have expressed 
so badly, and try to fill in some gaps that will 
be left in the present chapter.
Any writer in this area faces two main 
obstacles to clarity; the immense complexity of 
the problem, and the temptation to write as if 
repeating Wittgenstein's words could both manifest 
and convey an understanding of the problem. The 
oversimplicity and apparent disdain for the work 
of Wittgenstein of what follows should be seen 
as my attempt to avoid these obstacles.
I shall concentrate on one sceptical claim, 
the claim that only A can know what colour things 
seem to him. This example has all the all the 
features of standard sceptical examples rolled 
into one. It has the additional feature that 
Wittgenstein said little or nothing about it.
But its difficulties are, I think, difficulties 
with any sceptical claim.
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But the argument is still, I ’m afraid, long 
and quite complicated. A brief explanation now 
of its main points may make its digestion easier.
The main plot, so to speak, is the trouble 
that the results of Chapter Three can make for 
scepticism about other minds. The sub-plot is 
the beginning of an understanding of a fifth 
principle which will play an important role in 
subsequent chapters. The argument attempts to 
show
(i) the sceptic cannot explain B ’s belief
that A is in some mental state (section 3),
(ii) B does not need to have or feel A's 
mental state in order to have knowledge 
that A is in that mental state (section 4),
(iii) B can infer, with or without further 
information, on the basis of A's 
actions or behaviour, that A is in 
that mental state (section 5),
(iv) The fifth principle, which equates w h a t ' 
things are like with the beliefs that 
those things have the essential property 
of being able, under various conditions, 
to prompt or help to prompt (section 6),
(v) the explanation of A^s knowledge of his 
mental state contains (almost) all that 
is needed to explain B's knowledge that 
A is in that mental state (section 6).
The important claims here are (i) and (v), and they
rest on the principles of the last chapter and
(P.5) of the present chapter.
Section seven tries to connect earlier claims 
with something it calls 'human nature', in preparation
( 5 Z )
for Chapter Five. It also provides an attack on 
the sceptic's idea that we would never notice 
if our colour perceptions were the wrong way 
round; as the sceptic thinks they might well be.
It is not seriously anticipated that this 
chapter will do what even Wittgenstein could not 
quite manage and rid the world once and for all 
of the agitated spectre of the sceptic about our 
knowledge of other minds. For the sceptic only 
understands confusion and believes whatever it 
suits him to believe; and there is not, I hope, 
much confusion in this chapter, nor much it will 
suit a sceptic to believe.
The role of this chapter in the thesis is the 
discovery of (P.5) and some arguments in which it 
plays a role, and the hint to be taken later from 
section seven that human nature comes into the 
business of explanation and description. A‘ sceptic 
may find more food for thought in the next chapter, 
when things resembling his claims are incorporated 
into the developing picture of interpretation; these 
claims cannot revive scepticism, nor will there be 
much argument that they cannot.
.(Finally, two warnings about slack terminology. 
First, ’scepticism* •is usually short for 'scepticism 
about our knowledge of other minds', and secondly 
'mental state’ is short for 'mental state/event/ 
process/etc'.)
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T w o . The Form of Sceptical Claims.
Scepticism about other minds must be set 
in contrast with scepticism in general. For there 
might be something to be said for some form of 
general scepticism, but there is, I think, 
nothing to be said for the doctrine I shall 
identify as scepticism about other minds.
According to the strongest general scepticism 
we cannot know anything;
(5.1): (VS)(VA)(it is not possible that
A knows that S).
There are two weaker forms of general scepticism;
(3.2): (3S)(VA)(it is not possible that
A knows that S)
and, weaker still,
(s.3): (VA)(it is not possible that
(VS)(A knows that S)).
'We will have to look at the sorts of arguments 
that could be used to show each of these claims. 
Our first purpose is to look at (S.2), and merely 
to comment that it is rather unlikely that there 
could be an argument to show that, for example, 
(VA)(it is not possible that A knows that Julius 
Caesar was in pain at t) because,- even if no one 
else did, Caesar knew he was in pain at t. And, if 
I know what I feel, and what I think, and so on, 
there could not be a decent argument to show that 
these are things that cannot be known.
Scepticism about other minds is therefore 
put in a rather difficult position. For mental 
states are things we do have knowledge of; they 
are obvious counterexamples to (S.l), and not 
examples of (S.2), just as obviously.
The sceptic about other minds therefore claims 
something extremely bizarre;
(3.4): (3S)(3A)(A knows that S,
& (VB)(necessarily if B knows 
that S then B=A)).
The bizarreness of this will now emerge.
Three. The Objectivity of the Mental.
Suppose that A is looking at a tomato, and 
that B believes, rightly or wrongly, that the 
tomato looks red to A. Some will ask ’How could 
he possibly know that the tomato looks red to 
A ? Surely only A can know that.*
. I am going to look at what would happen if 
we thought that B could not know this. The sceptical 
claim, and the argument against it, exactly matches 
the argument of the previous chapter against the 
claim that we cannot know that a painting is 
beautiful.
Explanations of B ’s belief, if they are to 
dodge calling the belief knowledge, must avoid all 
mention of the fact that the tomato looks red to 
A. And the problem, as before, is that we need 
some kind of guarantee that these explanations
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correctly fix the sense of B's belief. The possible 
explanations offered by the sceptic must have 
something in common, in virtue of which they can 
all be relied on to get the sense of the belief 
right. And, according to (P.4)
If "S” has a clear sense, then an explanation 
"p" of A's belief that S correctly fixes the 
sense of the belief iff it explains reactions 
he has which'are reactions that would be explained 
by the fact that S if A perceived that S.
In the case of A's belief, even a sceptic will
say, there is no problem. A is obviously aware of 
the fact that the tomato looks red to him; he reacts 
to that fact in ways we need not here try to spell 
out.
But in the case of B's belief, the sceptic will 
say, there is a problem. For B cannot have A's 
awareness; he cannot have reactions that are typically 
explained by the fact that the tomato looks red to 
A. If this were right, and I shall argue that it is
not .right, then nothing could count as an explanation
of B's belief. That, admittedly, is just what some 
sceptics have thought all along.
But there is here a double oddity. First, the 
sceptic can offer no explanation of B's belief to 
which he can add a guarantee that it will fix the 
sense of that belief correctly. Secondly, as I shall 
now try to show, there is something strange in the 
idea that a fact (that the tomato looks red to A) 
can prompt reactions in A but cannot in B.
(5(^)
Pour. Beliefs about Mental States.
I have, I think, delayed as long as possible 
the provision of some explanation of what the 
reactions alluded to by (P.4) are supposed to be.
To clear this up a little, and to make one point 
about the difference between A's reaction to his 
perception and B's reaction to that same perception, 
is,the aim of this section.
If some fact or state of affairs is to explain 
someone's belief, there must be some causal link 
between that fact (and others perhaps) and the 
formation of the belief. Anything on that chain 
I call a reaction; we are most interested in the ' 
reactions of A and B, ie reactions that occur 
after the causal chain has entered the body of 
A or B, and of those reactions we are interested 
above all in the beliefs formed by A and Bl
Reactions prior to the formation of the belief 
can be picked out, as suggested in Chapter Three, 
by considering other ways in which the belief 
can be prompted, that is, other possible explanations 
of the belief. If A could be stimulated to his 
belief by, not a tomato but electrodes in the eye 
or brain, this may lead us to think that prior 
reactions in the chain that ends in the belief 
could include electrical activity in the nerves 
of the eye and brain.
We shall not say much about such prior reactions,
Cs^)
but concentrate on the two most important reactions, 
namely A ’s belief that he (A) has a perception of 
a tomato that is, or looks red, and B ’s belief that 
A has a perception of a tomato that is, or looks 
red. Both these beliefs, I would say, are perfectly 
explicable reactions to the fact that A has a 
certain perception.
But the sceptic thinks that only A can have 
such an explicable reaction to his perception. For 
only A can be aware of the perception; for B to 
be aware of A's perception would be for B to be 
(impossibly) A. His reason is this; to be aware 
of a mental state is just to have it, or to feel 
it, which B cannot do.
It is hard to make this sceptical confusion 
sound plausible. It is also hard to do better 
than merely deny it with the assertion that B can 
be aware of A's mental state.
Let's look at B's belief. B claims to know, 
somehow or other, that the tomato looks red to A.
And let's make one remark about the prior reactions 
in the chain that lead up to this belief; whatever 
they are they cannot lead B to think that the 
mental state of which they make him aware is one 
of his (B's) own mental states. So there is the 
following clear contrast between A's and B's 
knowledge of A's mental state; A is aware of it 
in a way that makes it clear to him that it is 
his perception, but B is aware of it in a way that 
makes it clear that it is someone else's perception.
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And we can explain this contrast, and why the 
sceptic's confusion is a confusion, quite easily.
From A's mental state a chain of reactions 
leads to the formation of 3's belief. Somewhere 
on this chain, I shall argue, there must be an 
action, or movement, or sign of life of, by or 
in A.
The contrast is explained as follows. A mental 
state of which one can have awareness without a 
crucial factor in the production of the awareness 
being an action can only be, and can be taken to 
be one of one's own mental states. But B is not 
led to think the state he is aware of is one of 
his own, because it is something in someone else 
that prompts that awareness; he knows A is in pain 
because he sees or hears A cry out in pain.
This contrast between mental states that are 
B's and those that are not, and B's ability to 
draw this contrast for himself in the right place, 
are things that must be described at the start of 
any enquiry such as that of the present chapter.
The sceptic's confused belief that to be aware of 
a mental state is to have it makes such descriptions 
impossible to even begin.
B does not know of A's mental state in the way 
that he knows of his owm, because - it is something 
that A does that provides this knowledge. This 
should not prevent us from saying that he knows 
of A's mental state in some other way, and that 
the differences between these two ways of being
(5-^ 1 )
aware of mental states is crucial to B's ability 
to distinguish, among the states of which he is 
aware, those that are his and those that are 
someone else's.
If B has knowledge of someone else's mental 
state, I claimed, somewhere in the production 
of that knowledge must be involved some action 
of, or sign of life in that person. If this needs 
defence perhaps the following thought will'serve; 
but for such action or movement or sign of life 
B could have no reason to think that the other 
person was even alive, or the owner of mental 
states at all.
Five. Interlude; Inferences from Behaviour.
Sceptics who have emphasised the different 
ways in which I am aware of my ovm. mental states 
and those of others, have added to this contrast 
the thought that I cannot know from his actions 
alone that A is in this or that mental state. 
Something is right in this thought, but I shall 
concentrate now on what is wrong with it.
It would be a way of knowing that A is in pain 
(I change the example for convenience and vividness) 
to see that A was sobbing in pain, or crying out. 
in agony. "Sobbing in pain" would; be a description 
of the behaviour that B sees; and seeing A sobbing 
in pain he is made aware of A ’s pain, or the fact 
that A is in pain (and not he (B) himself).
A sceptic may doubt two things, (at least); first
f e o )
that "sobbing in pain" is a viable and meaningful 
and bona fide description of behaviour, or second 
that B can distinguish sobbing in pain from mere 
sobbing.
Two points can be made in reply. First, even 
is (unbelievably) we cannot see when someone is 
sobbing in pain (not merely sobbing for all we 
know) we can, for all the sceptic has said, know 
that he is sobbing. So we can tell that he is 
unhappy; and surely this unhappiness is a mental 
state, not our o t o , of which we have knowledge. The 
difficulty with pain, whatever it is supposed by the 
sceptic to be, is not a general difficulty. And if 
there were a general difficulty then we would be 
unable to distinguish living people from dead, 
motionless corpses.
Secondly, we must ask the sceptic to characterise 
the range of things he thinks we can know ’about other 
people and to explain the point of this characterisation 
and what the things so characterised have in common 
that shows why we can only know these things.
The first point will suffice for our project of 
destroying scepticism. About the second I only note 
that this characterisation cannot use the terms we 
normally use, for if the sceptic is right they will 
not have any clear sense. It seems to me that the 
sceptic cannot even get started on this characterisation 
without these words; there is no interesting line 
to be drawn without them between unhappiness and 
pain, or even between states of consciousness and 
other states of things.
Cl)
Six. What Mental States are Like, and Why
3 Gan Know All that A Knows About A's Perceptions
This is an extremely long section, and one 
full of difficult arguments whose destinations 
may be obscure long after their arrival. I shall 
quickly endeavour to describe the ground that is 
to be covered before setting out, so that some 
feeling of progress and discovery may, however 
artificially, be induced from time to time.
The first thing we shall do is to explain 
what it is for something to look a particular 
way. This will be encapsulated in the promised 
new principle (P.5j.
We shall then look at explanations of A ’s 
beliefs about what his perceptions are like, how 
they look or seem to him. A simple and rather 
deceptive explanation will be given for our 
example of the tomato that looks red to A.-
Next we shall argue that if there is anything- 
in this simple explanation there must be another 
explanation in a more natural and familiar style, 
and we will eventually give an example of such 
an explanation too. This more natural explanation 
explains why the first explanation is able to 
explain what it tries to explain.
Finally, we argue that the materials of the . 
natural explanation of A's knowledge of his 
perception are all we need for a similar explanation 
of B's knowledge of A's perception. Sceptical 
doubts about this are then shown to involve the
(C2)
usual defect that the sceptic cannot, saying 
what he does, explain anything. With that much by 
way of prediction, let us begin, as predicted, 
with the looks of things.
We are supposing that A is looking at a tomato 
that looks red to him. Something about the tomato 
causes him to have a perception of it, which then 
prompts him to various beliefs, such as that the 
tomato looks red.
The locution ’It looks red to him' needs some 
explaining. Two points in particular demand our 
attention.
First, there is a use of 'looks' in which 
something may look red to A although he does not 
believe it is red. It may make this clearer to 
distinguish the two uses or senses of 'looks';
'It looks red to me' can mean either
(l.a) I reckon it's red, or
(l.b) it has a reddish look about it (resembles
in appearance things that are red).
Something may look (l.b) but not (l.a) red to A
even though he does not believe it is red.
Secondly, the natural reaction to something 
that looks red is to believe it is red. Only 
knowledge of present misleading perceptual conditions 
can dispose of this belief in favour of a belief 
to the effect that it looks red (l.b) but is in
fact orange. And such improvements on natural
beliefs are a condition of there being (l.b) locutions 
at all.
Let us make the situation clearer. Suppose that
[a)
the tomato A is looking at is not quite ripe, but 
is a sort of orange colour. But because of the 
lighting conditions at the time it looks red.
If it looks red, someone who is unaware of 
the lighting conditions will believe it is red; and 
if he says "It looks red to me" that will be a use 
of 'looks' like (l.a). The other use, where the 
simple belief is not present, may be made by 
someone who is aware of the lighting conditions;
"It looks red" then means something like that it 
has, in these lighting conditions, the property 
of red things to produce the belief that it is 
red (in the unwary).
I shall say that A's first reaction is to 
believe that the tomato is red, but his second 
(prompted by his knowledge of the lighting and 
so on) is to believe that it is orange and lit in 
a way that prompts the belief that it is red. Of 
course, if A has his wits about him the first 
belief may never actually cross his mind.
Why is this story about one belief after the 
other worth telling? It permits a simple account 
of the connection between (l.a) and (l.b); more 
importantly it leads us in the direction of a 
principle that I shall state and then try to 
clarify.
The principle is concerned with answers to 
questions such as 'What are orange tomatoes like?' 
or, better though much more clumsy 'What is it
( W
like for "The tomato is orange" to be true?’. And 
the answer in this case is that orange tomatoes 
essentially have the property of being able, 
under various conditions, to prompt or help to 
prompt various beliefs such as the ones we have 
discussed. In general
(P.5): What it is like for "S” to be true,
that is, what reactions under what 
conditions the fact that S is capable 
of prompting or helping to prompt, 
is (are) essential to "S"'s having 
the sense it has.
Three cautions should be noted before we go 
on. There is no restriction here either to facts 
about people and their mental states or to any other 
selection of facts about the world. Nor is it 
entailed by (P.5) that anyone in a mental state 
must be prompted to all the beliefs that the fact 
that he is in that mental state must be capable 
of prompting. Nor is it entailed that the beliefs 
can only be prompted in the person whose mental 
state is doing the prompting; quite the reverse, 
for as we shall soon see, if a state can prompt 
a belief in A it can (by more or less devious means) 
also prompt that belief in B. It is not true, as 
(S.4) would require, that for B to have these beliefs 
is for be to (impossibly) be A.
Let us concentrate on A's perception and the 
beliefs that the perception prompts in him. These 
beliefs are, in our story, first the belief that
the perception is a perception of a tomato that 
is red, and secondly the belief that the perception 
is a perception of a tomato that is orange but 
looks red (ie prompts the belief that it is red) 
because it is lit in misleading light.
How are we to explain these beliefs? One way 
would be to say, much as (P.5) would say, that 
it's essential to the truth of "A’s perception 
is a perception of a tomato that is orange but 
looks red because it is lit in a misleading way" 
(which is the best description of A's perception) 
that
(l) the perception looks like (ie is capable 
of helping to prompt the belief that it- 
is) a perception of a tomato that is red, 
and also looks like a perception of an 
orange tomato that looks red because of 
the way it is lit.
There is nothing wrong with this explanation.
But it leans on the possibility of a more interesting 
which we shall supply shortly. This more interesting 
explanation will be of a quite familiar kind and 
more natural than (l). But for those who will try 
to trace what they consider to be subsequent errors 
in the argument to this point, I offer an explanation 
of why (l) depends on the possibility of this other 
natural explanation.
The perception may, as (1) rightly says, be 
capable of helping to prompt A ’s beliefs. But for 
A to actually get as far as believing that his
perception is of a red tomato (his first belief) 
he must be prepared to believe that there is a 
red tomato that is responsible for the perception.
And to get as far as believing that the perception 
is of an orange tomato that looks red A must be 
prepared to believe that the lighting conditions 
are misleading.
(It might be added that A must also be prepared, 
in both cases, to believe that his perceptual 
system is normal, that he sees red things as red.
If he did not believe this he would not know what 
his first belief should be; ’the perception is of 
a tomato that is red/green/or what?’. But we do 
not need this unnecessarily complicating addition.)
How are we to explain these further beliefs 
that A must have? For the perception can only prompt 
A to his first and second beliefs about the perception 
if he has, or is prompted to these further beliefs.
It may well be, and I daresay usually will be' 
that the perception prompts these further beliefs 
too. It’s often on the basis of the perception that 
we believe that there is a tomato responsible for 
the perception. But what account can we give of 
how the perception prompts this belief, and with^  J. X /
it prompts A ’s first belief? How, in the more 
interesting case, does his perception prompt in 
A the belief that the lighting conditions are 
misleading? Where does A get his second belief 
from?
The explanation of the second belief must involve
(C2)
further perceptions. Let us suppose that A also 
examines the tomato in normal light; his first 
belief will then be that the tomato is orange, 
and he may consider taking on the second belief 
that the tomato is red but looks orange because 
of the lighting conditions. (This belief would be 
false, of course, and we shall suppose he does 
not take up its offer.)
If we can explain his second belief in the 
misleading case, and his not believing in the 
normal lighting case that the tomato is red but 
looks orange, we must use such facts as these;
(2) orange things look orange in lighting 
conditions (normal light),
(3) orange things look red in lighting 
conditions G^,
(4) there are no lighting conditions in 
which red things look orange.
The so-called 'fact (4)’ may well be false.
If it were true it would explain, given the various 
ways the tomato looks to A (ie red at one time 
and orange at another), why A believes that the 
tomato is orange and turns down the second belief 
in the normal lighting case.
But even if (4) is false, it is easy to add 
to (2) to (4), and to describe further investigations 
that A might perform to disover the real colour 
of the tomato. A sample of something white would 
do the trick very quickly.
An analog^/- with a clearer example may help.
Someone looking at a coin may arrive first (in 
our story) at the belief that it is elliptical, 
and that his perception is a perception of an 
ellipse, then at the belief that it is circular 
but viewed from an angle, and his perception is 
of a circle from an angle. Pacts, analogous to
(2) to (4) about how the apparent shapes of 
circles depend upon their real shape and the 
perspective of the observer will be involved in 
the explanation of the beliefs he has about his 
perception and, more importantly, the beliefs 
he has about the object that it is a perception 
of.
The point of all this may be fading, but let 
us see if we can now claim that facts such as
(2) to (4) are.indispensible to the explanation 
of how A ’s perceptions prompt him to the beliefs 
about objects and lighting conditions and so on 
that he must be prompted to if the perception is 
to prompt him to his first and second beliefs 
about the perception.
(Someone might say that, rather than take on 
his first belief, A could believe instead that his 
perception is one that looks like (ie is capable 
of prompting the belief that it is) a perception, 
of a tomato that is red. I would ask 'Why does 
A believe this? Why does he think that the 
perception can prompt this belief if he is not 
ready to think that the belief could be supported? 
And what does he think could support it if not
facts like (2) to (4)?*.)
I've been trying to show that the explanation 
by (l) of A ’s beliefs depends on the possibility 
of a more natural explanation. The argument has 
been difficult; it has claimed that if there 
are beliefs about perceptions that (l) can explain, 
then there must be facts like (2) to (4) that can 
explain the perceptions in a way that explains 
how those perceptions prompt the beliefs (ie. how 
(1) explains the beliefs).
Let's look at this natural explanation. In the 
case of A's second belief it will be very complex, 
involving several perceptions and beliefs and many 
inferences and facts like (2) to (4). So we will 
just look at the explanation of A's first belief 
that his perception is of a tomato that is red.
This belief is false, but the explanation is 
quite simple.
We need only say the following; the tomato is 
orange, the lighting conditions are Cg and, 
according to (3), orange things look red in 
(that is, orange things in Gg prompt the belief 
that they are red). So A believes the tomato is 
red; he therefore believes his perception is of 
a tomato that is red.
I want now to argue that such, explanations of 
A's beliefs contain almost all we need to explain 
B's corresponding belief. We will return to the 
more complex case, but at least B ’s belief here 
(that A's perception is of a tomato that is orange 
but looks red to A) will be true.
~^o)
How does B arrive at knowledge of A ’s mental 
state? If he is to know that it is A ’s, not his 
own, or anyone else’s, A must, we have argued in 
section four, do something. It’s no good A just 
sitting there like a man looking at a tomato that 
looks red to him, for B might not even be able to 
tell that A was aware of the tomato (rather than, 
say, wondering what to do about supper). A must 
do for his perception of the tomato what crying 
out does for pain; he must give a sign that he 
has it. Let us supoose, then, that he reaches for 
the tomato, and that B then knows at least that 
A has seen the tomato. (If this gesture does not' 
sound unambiguous, we might suppose that A begins 
to sketch the tomato, or something.)
Now all that B needs, it seems to me, to know 
that A ’s perception is a perception of a tomato 
that is orange but looks red because it is lit 
by conditions Cg, is the belief that the lighting 
conditions are Cg, that the tomato is orange (which 
B can work out just as well as A), and the fact 
( that will be part of the explanation of B ’s 
knowledge that the tomato is orange) that
(3) orange things look red in lighting 
conditions Cg.
B can come to know that A ’s perception is one of
an orange tomato that looks red because it is lit
in a misleading way.
B will not really go through anything that 
could be called ratiocination here. The conclusion
we draw is not that B can infer these things about 
A ’s perception (though he can if he needs to) but 
that whatever is needed to explain A ’s knowledge 
of his perception is enough to explain B ’s 
knowledge too (or nearly enough; we skip the 
point that A ’s action is involved in B ’s knowledge 
Thus if some mental state can prompt reactions 
in A that we can explain it can also (via some 
action of A ’s) promut the same reactions in B 
and we can explain these reactions too.
7/e will consider sceptical replies to this 
shortly. Let us first summarise what the argument 
has tried to show, and what, if this one fails, 
a better argument will have to show.
It’s essential to a thing’s being orange that 
it looks various colours under various lighting 
conditions. It’s essential, that is, to a thing’s 
being orange that there are facts like (2) to (4). 
For that reason, it’s essential to the explanation 
of A ’s belief that his perception is of a thing 
that is orange (but looks red, perhaps) that such 
things as (2) to (4) are true. But if such things 
are true then B can know that A ’s perception is 
of something of which (3) is true, and can know 
(if he knows that much and that the lighting 
conditions are Cg) how the thing looks to A. For
(3) says that
(3) orange things look red in lighting 
conditions Cg,
and, so to speak, if it.looks red then it looks 
red to A like the rest of us.
This long argument, in its summary form, can 
be collapsed even further. And the effect may be 
to make what was wrong with scepticism obscure, 
inasmuch as it can suddenly seem completely and 
dreadfully absurd. We could argue as follows; what 
is involved in "orange" having a sense, as it 
must if A is to have his knowledge of his mental 
state, is for there to be facts like (2) to (4).
But if there were no explanation of B ’s beliefs 
about A ’s mental state there could not be such 
facts as (2) to (4), and "orange", or some word 
in the specification of what B believes A believes, 
would have no sense.
A sceptic, tiresomely inventive, will not be 
lost for long to reply to this argument. ’It is 
only essential to explanation and the sense of 
"orange"- in these beliefs that such things as
(3*) orange things look red to A in lighting 
conditions
are true. This explains A ’s belief, but B can 
only know that
(3*') orange things look red to B in lighting 
conditions .
(3*) cannot enter into the explanation of B ’s
beliefs.* But this is, as usual, a very bad reply.
Sunnose an object looks red to B. The only way 
we could exulain this without agreeing to (3*0> as 
using (3) would make us do, would be if it’s 
quite possible that things that look red to B
(A3)
look green (or blue, or yellow) to A. I shall 
discuss this possibility in the last section.
It seems to me that something like it could be 
possible, but that we could easily know if A did 
see things this way, and if he did he would have 
to have a very strange perceptual mechanism.
So let us suppose, until the last section, that 
A and B both have normal mechanisms.
How could the sceptic explain something’s 
looking red to B? There are various possibilities;
the object is red and red things look red 
to B in lighting conditions G^,
the object is orange and orange things look 
red to B in lighting conditions G^,
the object is yellow and yellow things look 
red to B in lighting conditions C^,
etc.
But, as always, the question is ’What do these 
explanation have in common that guarantees that 
they can all explain the object's looking red 
to B? What would be wrong with explaining its 
looking red to B by saying it was square and 
square things look red to B?*.
I predict that this guarantee, when the sceptic 
finally gets down to providing it, will also 
guarantee that that A will see the object as red. 
That is, unless the guarantee makes reference to 
some relevant feature of B, essential to seeing 
this object as red, that A lacks. But we are 
supposing they both have normal perceptual systems. 
Let us look at the answer I would give to
this question. The conditions set out by each of 
the foregoiny alternative explanations are such 
that under those conditions it is always light 
of a particular colour, namely red light, that 
is reflected by the object. If this guarantees 
that the object looks red to B, which it does 
guarantee, then it will guarantee that the same 
object under the same conditions will look red 
to A (modulo variations in perceptual mechanism).
More than a perceptual mechanism is involved 
in having beliefs about one’s perceptions, but 
these point can be left aside, unless the sceptic 
can find a way to make them work for him (and I 
do not see how he could).
One thing must be noted to avoid the impression 
that the argument has not moved forwards. We were 
arguing that if a mental state can produce a' 
reaction in A then it can produce (via some action 
of A ’s) the same reaction in B. We are now arguing 
that if something in the world, not one of his 
own mental states, can produce a reaction in B 
(via a perception), it can, and will under the 
same conditions, produce that reaction in A. (The 
complications of ’privileged access’ to one’s own 
mental states do not arise here).
For it turns out that what mental states are 
like depends in part on how the world is. And we 
should hardly be surprised to find a sceptic, 
claiming in defence of his scepticism that the 
reactions of observers to the world can vary for 
no reason between them without limit, at a complete
(as)
loss to identify the things in the world that 
explain, or are responsible for those reactions.
Seven. Two Ideas Behind Scepticism.
In this last section I shall look at why it 
may have seemed that for all we know some of us 
could see things that look red to us (ie, as a 
rule, red things) as green, or any other colour 
you care to think of. There seem to me to be two 
thoughts that can be blamed for this fantasy.
First, it may have seemed that it would be 
easy to map the spectrum, divided into the bands 
as we divide it, onto itself so that the divisions 
but not the colours corresponded;
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There are two major difficulties with what seems 
so simple. First, wavelengths in the untraviolet 
region of the spectrum (down to about 350 nm) are 
normally filtered out by the refracting media of
(Ji)
the eye, but at sufficiently intense levels can 
be perceived, as blue-violet. But someone with 
spectrum II would be surprised to find, not the 
usual vague boundary between violet and blue but 
a sudden change from violet to yellow. He might 
also wonder what these violet specimins were 
doing at the end of the spectrum instead of in 
the middle with the others.
It would not be much good to widen the range 
of the ’violet* of I and the ’yellow’ of II. For 
the extra violets are, at standard intensities, 
invisible, but how could the extra yellows of 
II be invisible (yellow being such a clear and 
bright colour) and what would someone who had 
spectrum II think of these invisible violets in 
the middle of his spectrum where spectrum I has 
yellows?
The difficulty depends on two things. We are 
least sensitive to colours on the edge of the 
visible spectrum (obviously enough). And any such 
mapping as that from I to II will create clear 
discontinuities in II that are not present in 
I, as the vagueness of colour words amply shows.
Perhaps someone who had spectrum II would be 
highly sensitive to colours in the middle of II. 
But what would it be like to find dark and gloomy 
colours like violet bright and clear, and to find 
orange a dim and obscure colour (added by Newton 
to the spectrum only to make up the number of 
major colours to seven)?
A 4 )
There is a second difficulty. How could spectrum 
II accomodate the subdivisions within major colours 
of spectrum I? For we distinguish several kinds 
of red within the broad and natural major division; 
scarlet, crimson, vermillion, magenta, cerise, and 
so on. But (to exaggerate the exegetical point 
beyond strict accuracy) there are no subdivisions 
in the green band.
So how could someone colour in the area marked 
'green' of spectrum II, using the one and only 
green that there is in spectrum I and yet make 
clear the distinctions drawn within the area of 
spectrum I marked 'red*? And which red would he 
use for the single colour called, in spectrum 
II 'red*?
It is tempting to invent new greens, and to say 
that as some people are red-green colourblind, so 
someone who had spectrum II would be scarlet-etc- 
cerise colourblind, and we, who have spectrum I 
are blind to various shades of green discriminated 
by those who have spectrum II.
But there are no such various shades of green 
(in our exaggeration). And the image of colour­
blindness must not be allowed to confuse us into 
thinking that there are.
Foi^ to be colourblind is, in most cases, for 
one or more of the three kinds of cone receptors 
of the retina not to work (eg, the red receptors). 
Colourblind people are not sensitive to certain 
kinds of light, much as we are not sensitive to
X-rays. But we are sensitive to green light; so 
what are the missing or inactive receptors that 
are meant to allow us to distinguish the new 
greens supposed to be? What kind of light would 
they be sensitive to that we are not sensitive 
to already?
It may be that some nimble surgeon could so 
interfere with someone's eyesight that that patient 
emerged from treatment with a bizarre spectrum.
The surgeon might connect the red cones of the 
retina to nerves intended for blue cones, the green 
cones to the red nerves and finally the blue cones 
to the green nerves. The patient's resulting 
spectrum would not be II, but a spectrum that 
would share the difficulties of II; he would be 
sensitive to colours on the edge of his spectrum 
and have gaps in the middle, and he would be 
unable to make discriminations he used to find 
clear (differently coloured objects, some cerise, 
some crimson, etc, would all look the same) 
and he would never find uses for those old clear 
discriminations (grass might seem to him to keep 
changing between various reds, but he would know 
that it was really always the same, or nearly the 
same green). It would be the easiest thing in the 
world to find out that his spectrum was not our 
spectrum I.
I conclude that these reversed snectra do not
fulfil their sceptical mission of confining B to 
(3’*)* But even if they did the argument of section 
six would stand; nothing could explain the way 
things look to B without going into detail about 
how those things look (and thus look to A). This 
argument is not damaged by the fact that such 
bizarre reversed spectra may be possible, for the 
conditions of reversal (which will depend on the 
nature of perception and of the eye in particular) 
will be part of the explanation of reversed 
perceptions; such an explanation will not apply to 
B or to anyone with normal eyes.
It may be admitted that the facts we have said 
can explain perception can be relativised to kinds 
of perceptual system. Thus we might have
(2*) orange things look orange in to people 
with perceptual mechanism
(2'') orange things look blue in to-‘people 
with perceptual mechanism Pg
(5**) indigo things look orange in to people 
with perceptual system P^
etc, etc.
But we ask again what do the various explanations 
of something's looking orange to someone have in 
common? If nothing, then "orange" has no clear sense, 
so they must have something in common. If our 
surgeon story can be believed it will be something 
like this; under each of the conditions under which 
an explanation explains something's looking orange, 
a certain type of nerve from the retina is being 
activated (in one case by orange receptors, in others by
blue receptors). There is nothing in this relativisation 
for the sceptic to get excited about; we are just 
getting to understand better the conditions under 
which an object looks orange to someone.
For most of us it is orange things that usually 
look orange; we have normal eyesight, called 
in the relativised explanations. We know we have 
normal eyesight because of the things we say about 
how things seem to us. ('Normal' here can be 
explained either in neurophysiological terms or 
in terms of how things look to people with such 
perceptual mechanisms.)
Reluctance to accept these points may stem from 
the errors of a second thought that has fanned the 
flames of scepticism. The thought is hard to put 
properly, but it is roughly the idea that someone 
who has, from birth, seen things the wrong way round 
will not notice anything odd. (For he will never 
have knov/n anything else; red grass would be 
common, sunsets everyday.)
Let us widen the scope of this thought. For my 
ov/n instinct is to say that bright red grass would 
be a rather unpleasant sight all the time, and the 
sickly pale green faces of women, the sinister 
blue of daffodils, the inescapable tormenting 
yellow of the sky, the indigo earth and orange 
sea (all reminiscent, as I write, of the hallucinatory 
scene in Munch's painting 'The Scream') would make 
the world seem a quite uninhabitable nightmare.
And, more generally, to see good as bad but still
(«o
prefer bad, or to see love as hate but to yearn 
for and to freely dispense hatred, to to see cats 
as dogs but still keep a cat to scare off burglars, 
would be to be unimaginably mad.
Why should these more general points be less 
plausible than the colour case? Perhaps it is 
easy to imagine how one could get used to colours 
that initially seemed ugly (black skin must be 
a case of this, and perhaps some of my examples 
would be pleasant rather than nightmarish). Or 
one could be bribed to put up with the way things 
look.
I have two points to make. It seems unlikely . 
to me that none of these things would not seem 
ugly to the man who saw them coloured so strangely. 
Colour has a lot to do with attraction. Secondly, 
even if some force could be brought to bear to 
make a man put up with what he saw, and to show 
no sign that his snectrum was unusual, the natural 
reactions of disgust, or whatever, would return 
as soon as the force w^ as released.
Certainly i t ’s no good saying that the man 
with the reversed srectrum would never notice 
anything odd; that is just to deny that anyone 
(even he) could ever know that he had a reversed . 
spectrum. We do not, as the sceptic secretly thinks, 
arrive in the world ready for anything, without 
prejudice or expectation and prepared to embrace 
whatever aspiration comes first to mind. Could we 
seriously expect to get away with saying that people
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who have always lived in conditions of scarcity 
and degradation might still notice nothing funny 
but be quite content and used to those conditions 
for the simple reason that they have never known 
anything else? Our interest is in how the world 
really is, never mind how it seems, and in the 
endless problems of reconciling our limited versatility 
with that world and its disappointments as childhood 
becomes a thing of our past. (And we would mind 
very much if such reconciliation were to be as far 
beyond us as I suspect it would be if we thought 
things were as the man with the reversed spectrum 
would, for a time, think they were.)
Something, then, in human nature would prevent 
poker-faced uniformly normal behaviour in the man 
with the reversed spectrum. Our system of colour 
classifications are made by and for people with 
natural tendencies to divide the spectrum into a 
few major groups of colours, people who also have" 
particular interests in some finer discriminations, 
and, most importantly, dispositions to find some 
colours bright and cheerful and others dull and 
gloomy. If colours were not all these things to us 
we would have little or no interest in having 
concepts of colours. If we could not be brought to 
care about colour then perhaps we could not ever 
bring ourselves to know that someone had a reversed 
spectrum; but this is not the sceptic’s point, and 
it is perhaps irrelevant anyway, as we care quite 
a lot about colour (enough to fight about the 
perception of colour, for a start).
As)
Chapter Five. 'Other Minds; Part Two*
One. Introduction.
After the complexities of the last chapter, 
it will be a relief now to return to some simpler 
thoughts and generalisations about the description 
and explanation of the experiences and conduct 
of speakers.
I shall try to use some of the points made in 
the last chapter to fill in some of the details of 
our account of what it is to make sense of sneakers. 
This will advance the project, which I may have 
given the impression had been abandoned, of making 
(R.3), and our ideas about commitment clearer.
We will also look at our principles of explanation 
in action in the hardest case; explaining,- in detail 
that was blurred a little when we looked at this 
case in the last chapter, one man's beliefs about 
another man’s mental states. This will lead us to 
reply to one sceptical argument that we did not 
examine in the last chapter; the argument that a 
theorist cannot know, among possible explanations 
of his subjects’ experiences and conduct, which one 
is right. We shall concede something to this 
argument that will be important in the final chapter 
when we go back to (R.3) and the commitments of 
subject and theorist.
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Two. The Reactions that Prompt Beliefs; Some 
Generalisations and Another Case in Detail.
I am going to deploy some of the points made 
in the last chapter to my own purpose, which is 
the sketching of a framework for the philosophy 
of mind rather than the refutation (as the last 
chapter was intended to be) of the view that there 
could be no such thing.
Principles (P.4) and (P.5) were concerned with 
the explanation of beliefs. And we shall now begin 
to make the picture of the explanation of beliefs 
a little clearer.
That a tomato is orange may explain someone’s, 
perception of the tomato, and also explain the 
beliefs that the perception may prompt in him. In 
general something in the world explains a perception, 
which in turn explains beliefs. (’Perception’ here 
include the work of all five senses, and others if 
there are others responsible for our beliefs.)
In any given case we will have reactions explained 
by the fact that p. in accordance with (P.4). And 
those reactions will be essentially capable, as 
(P.5) applies to them as much as it applies to any 
other thing, of prompting the belief that S. Thus 
we have, as we argued in section six of the last ' 
chapter
(l) A ’s perception prompts his belief, as 
(P.5) claims, and the fact that p can 
(and we shall suppose has done so) prompt 
the belief, as (P.5) also claims.
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(2) The fact that p explains A ’s belief 
by explaining his perception (and 
other reactions, perhaps) as (P.4) claims.
There are, as we argued, two explanations of 
A's belief; he believes that S because he has some 
reaction (a perception), and, if there is an 
explanation of this sort, that appeals to (P.5), 
there must be an explanation in the more natural 
style of (P.4) to the effect that A believes that 
S because of the fact that p (and has ’ a perception 
which, because it is explained by the fact that p 
will be such that, as (P.5) claims, can prompt the 
belief that S)..
We can, then, explain A's belief as a reaction 
of the sort specified by (P.5) to some fact, either 
a perception A has, or something about the world to 
which he has reacted with the belief. But it's 
important that the perception, the world, and the 
belief are connected as (P.4) can connect them if 
by 'reactions' we do not just mean beliefs.
For if, by 'reactions' in (P.4), we just meant 
beliefs, then (P.4) would be rather unilluminating. 
It would come to little more than the claim that 
the fact that p oan fix the sense of A's belief 
that S iff the fact that p explains (what is 
typically explained by the fact that S when A 
perceives that S) the belief that S. But reactions 
are not just beliefs, and the most interesting 
applications of (P.4) are when the belief that S 
is not knowledge but is explained by reactions
U)
other than the perception that S.
Reactions importantly include perceptions. And 
where there is a belief there must have been a 
perception; the reactions in (P.4) could not be 
just beliefs. Why do I say this? Surely the old 
empiricist maxim that there's nothing in the mind 
that didn't get in through the senses can't still 
be taken seriously?
The point may by now be familiar and tiring to 
recite. But if (P.4) was as trivial as the version 
in the last but one paragraph we would be stuck.
For the only explanation we could give of what rival 
explanations of the belief have in common, in virtue 
of which common property they can each fix the sense 
of the belief would be this; they have the common 
property that they all correctly fix the sense of 
the belief that S.
On the other hand, if there are reactions other 
than beliefs, and the explanations of particular 
beliefs can be unified by something other than their 
mere claim to explain that belief, then those 
reactions must include perceptions. The first reaction 
on any chain that leads to the formation of a belief 
is a perception (which may have its present effect 
on belief only through beliefs it has prompted at 
some earlier time, or through memory). For all chains, 
if our argument that there will always be what we 
called the more natural explanation of the belief 
is right, start in the world, and must enter the 
consciousness of the subject in perception.
The theorist's description of his subjects 
must, therfore, at least explain the perceptions 
of his subjects in a way that explains their 
beliefs. (P.4) and (P.5) are intended to go a 
little way to elucidating what it is for the 
theorist’s description to do this.
But there is a difficulty here that we must 
now go into. And perhaps this difficulty should 
have been looked into sooner, as it seems to be 
a problem for (P.5), and may have cast doubt on 
that principle and the results that we obtained 
with its help.
The difficulty is this. Suppose a man comes to 
believe his wife is having an affair, because one 
day he sees a bottle of new perfume on her shelf.
If this is the explanation of his belief then so 
be it; but it has been a constant tactic of ours to 
claim that not just anything can count as an 
explanation of a belief. The explanations must all 
have something in common.
But what does this explanation have in common 
with other explanations of beliefs about the affairs 
of wives? Only this; that she is having an affair 
would explain the new perfume, his perception and 
his belief. But the purchase of new perfume is, 
regrettably perhaps, and despite what advertisers 
would have us think, no guarantee of participation 
in an affair; it's hardly essential to there being 
new perfume on the shelf that this belief can
thereby be prompted.
Equally, and for the same reasons, what the 
explanation has in common with others is not 
enough to explain why the perception of the perfume 
can prompt the belief. But it does, we are supposing, 
prompt it, if only because no other explanation 
of the perfume occurs to the husband.
The moral we must draw from this is as follows. 
First, there may be explanation of beliefs that 
are the best explanations but still not very good 
explanations ; they may be unable to fix the sense 
of the belief. Secondly, therefore, if anything 
fixes the sense of the belief it must be what the 
belief explains rather than what explains it. (I 
have in mind the husband's subsequent jealous 
behaviour.)
To have one's beliefs prompted by the facts, 
and in accordance with (P.5), is to be more rational 
than any of us are very often; (P.5), of course, 
can't be faulted just because we sometimes jump 
blindly and without reason to beliefs for which we 
can only offer paltry explanations in which how 
the world was plays little or no explanatory role.
I want to claim that there are cases like this 
and that they pose a problem for the theorist. For 
how is he to guess what belief a man has grabbed 
from glancing at a bottle of new perfume? For a 
jealous belief involves much more than the belief 
that your wife has bought some perfume ; you have
to be prepared to believe many other things about 
her, and there is no good explanation of how the 
bottle of perfume can be held responsible for these 
further beliefs. A theorist who wants to claim that 
his description explains better than any other the 
experiences and conduct of his subjects will have 
to look elsewhere for support for his claim that 
the husband has a jealous belief.
That the theorist must look at the behaviour 
of his subjects should come as no surprise, nor 
should it involve us in discussions we would not 
otherwise have had to bother with. For we argued 
in section four of the last chapter that (even 
where there is a good explanation of A's belief) 
an essential role in the production of the belief 
of the theorist about A is played by one or more of 
A ’s actions. But in that section we said very little 
about how A's actions play this role, so we shall" 
now try to deal with this problem.
We will look closely at the chain that leads from 
a mental state of A's to B's belief that A is in 
that mental state. Two links on the chain will be 
crucial. First, there is A's action, and secondly 
there is B's perception (which will be at least a 
perception that A has done what he has done, and 
may be, and I shall argue will be a perception that 
A is in that mental state). Both these things are 
reactions to the fact that A is in the mental state.
Thus, in (P.4) we suppose that "A sees a tomato 
that looks red to him" has a sense. So an explanation
"p" of B's belief that A sees a tomato that looks 
red to him (A) correctly fixes the sense of B ’s 
belief iff it explains reactions he has which are 
reactions that would be explained by the fact that 
A sees a tomato that looks red to him if B perceived 
that A saw a tomato that looked red to him (A).
What are these reactions? Most important among 
them is B's perception, and we note two things 
about that perception. First, it must be that the 
perception explains B's belief, and secondly, it 
must be that some action by A explains the perception 
These two explanations can be in the style of (P.5); 
roughly, they will be
First; it's essential to B's perception being 
that perception that it can prompt 
in B the belief he has,
Second; it's essential to A's action being that 
action that it can prompt in B the 
perception he has.
There will, I think, be a third explanation 
in the style of (P.5);
Third; it's essential to A's mental state 
being that mental state that it can 
prompt in A the action he does.
The need for this may be clear, but if not will
now be made clear. The argument resembles an
argument from section six of the last chapter.
Suppose that B's belief is that A is sketching 
the tomato. If he is prepared to believe this on 
the evidence of what he sees, he must be prepared 
to believe that A has seen the tomato.
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So what will be the explanation of B's belief 
that makes it clear why B is prompted by his 
perception to these beliefs? Clearly it will be 
something like this; B has the belief because, 
among other things no doubt, A has seen the tomato 
(and is now sketching it).
That A has seen the tomato explains a number 
of things; that he is now sketching it, that B 
sees him sketching it, and that B believes that he 
has seen it and is now sketching it. This natural 
explanation explains why the three (P.5)-type 
explanations do really explain what they say they . 
d o .
The present example may be the least suggestive 
example we could have used. But a couple of more 
general remarks may still be possible without too 
much further illustration.
Whenever B believes that A has done some action, 
he must be prepared to believe something about A's 
mental state; he must be prepared to attribute at 
least the intention to do the action, and more 
than that some perceptions or concerns or decisions 
that prompted the action. Just what these mental 
states will be will depend on what B is prepared 
to believe about the action; to take one case, if 
he believes that A is sobbing he will believe that 
A is unhapny, but if he realises or sees that the 
sobbing is sobbing in pain, he will believe that 
A is (unhapoy because he is) in pain.
There is no expectation that B will always be
able to see straight off exactly what A is doing. 
Suppose that A is just standing by the sea and 
thinking about various things. B will not be able 
to see from A ’s action of standing around just what 
it is that A is thinking about, though the chances 
are quite good that he will see that A is thinking 
about something even if he does not know what.
To make this-clearer; an action of A's may not 
immediately prompt all the beliefs in B that it 
is capable of prompting. Further, and even more 
obviously, there may be many actions that can look 
much the same, that can, in other words, start off 
by prompting much the same beliefs.
(Here we have a contrast between A's knowledge 
of his mental state and B's; for surely mental 
states, especially thoughts, are easier to distinguish 
than the actions they prompt by which others may 
know them.)
In most cases the action that A can perform 
that will make his mental state clearest will be 
(insofar as he knows what mental state it is) to 
tell B. This will, if he understands it, prompt 
B to further beliefs about the mental state that 
he had until then identified only hazily. And in 
this case, as in all cases where B comes to see . 
what mental state A is in, the mental state explains 
the action (the telling), B's perception and B's 
belief about A's mental state.
(One point may be worth making to prevent these 
remarks from inspiring a resurgence of scepticism.
It may be possible, in many cases, for A to keep 
his mental states a secret if he wants to. We are 
inclined to say that B cannot know what A ’s mental 
state is unless A tells him. The point we should 
observe is that we should not say
(1) if A has not at time t told B what mental 
state he is in, then it’s not the case 
that B can at time t know what mental 
state A is in.
For it's only true that he does not at time t know
what mental state A is in; he can at time t know
if A can at time t (or later) tell him. So we should
rather say
(2) it can't be the case that A has not at 
time t told B what mental state he is in 
yet B knows at time t what mental state 
A is in.
(2) is, but (1) is not consistent with the denial
of (s.4).)
Before we go more deeply into this explanation 
of B's belief, the role of the action of A in it, 
and the things that must be true if there is to 
be such an explanation of the belief, let us pause 
to rid ourselves of some popular misconceptions 
about what is involved in this explanation.
Three. Interlude; The Argument from Analogy.
Many philosophers have been so frightened by 
scepticism that they have proposed that we know 
about the mental states of others by an argument 
along the following lines. (There is, I think.
something in this idea which we shall try to make 
clear later; for the moment I concentrate, as so 
often, on what is wrong with the idea.)
(1) A is doing something
(2) Whenever I do that it is because I am 
in mental state M
(3) From (2) it follows that whenever A 
does what he is doing he is in mental 
state M
(4) Therefore, from (l) and (2) it follows 
that A is in mental state M.
An example may make us see something badly 
wrong with this;
(1) A is giving someone a present
(2) Whenever I give someone a present it is 
because I think that they are going to 
give me an even better present back
(3) From (2) it follows that whenever A 
gives someone a present it is because 
he thinks they are going to give him
an even better present back
(4) Therefore, from (1) and (2) it follows 
that A thinks they are going to give 
him an even bigger present back.
Two things must be noted. First, (2) in no 
way entails (3); the falsity of (3) is not ruled 
out by the truth of (2).
Secondly, if we try to make the argument valid 
(or more like a valid argument) by adding such 
premisses as
(1’) A is just as selfish as I am
we can always get away with an equivalent premiss
As)
like
(1'*) A is as selfish as it's possible for 
someone to be
and have no need of (2) at all. That is, in any
valid argument from (1) to some conclusion about
A's mental state there will be no need for (2).
The failure of the argument from analogy is 
inevitable, given its mission. For it was somehow 
meant to show that we can know, on the basis of 
what sceptics said we can know, things that 
sceptics said we cannot know; and if the sceptic 
has not made a total mess of saying what he thinks 
we can know about other people, the argument is 
not going to be valid.
And it's to the credit of sceptics that they 
have never been very impressed with the argument 
from analogy. Indeed they've been impressed with 
something that is very hard to reconcile with 
the argument.
We have already mentioned this point, but we 
can mention it again. It is very hard, in many 
cases, to see straight off what mental state a man 
is in; in some cases it may be impossible (in 
those cases where I need him to tell me about his 
mental state). But, if the argument from analogy 
was any good we would expect to be able in any 
given case to see straight off what mental state 
the man is in.
In some of these cases he may be unable to 
explain what his mental state is, for he may not
know what it is ('Is it love or lust, is it hunger 
or an ulcer? V'/hat was that curious feeling? etc').
And even if he can explain it I may not be sure 
that I completely understand, or may be wrong if 
I am sure. There is really not much room for these 
points in the thoughts that inspired the argument 
from analogy.
Nor, I think, is there much room for the sorts 
of explanation we are inclined to give of these points. 
What we are inclined to say is this; it is often 
essential to grasping what mental state someone is 
in that you have had the same sort of experience 
yourself. Unless you've been in a war you don't 
know what it's like, unless yo u ’ve smoked marijuana 
or been a parent yourself, spent a long period out 
of work, actually listened to some Stockhausen, 
you will not have much idea what others' experiences 
of these things are like.
Let us not get tangled up in scepticism again.
We have said all that will be said about it. What 
is right, if anything, in the above sort of explanation 
is not the idea that to know what pain is like you 
must feel pain. It was the whole point of the 
last chapter to point out that this is false.
What strikes me as right is a double thought, 
the first half trivial. Firstly, it may be that 
someone can for whatever reason be very obstinate 
about something, or refuse to believe that, say, 
war is anything but a holiday. Descriptions of 
moulding bodies in trenches will have no effect
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on him, and maybe the only way to get such-a 
person to know what war is like is to drop him 
in the middle of the nearest one. Obstinacy, 
however, is not a problem for the theses I 
defend about the objectivity of the mental.
More importantly, it seems right to say that 
something must take the place of experience of 
a war if a theorist cannot get himself to one and 
still wants to know what it is like. He must be 
somehow brought to know what experience of war 
itself would otherwise tell him. He must, that is, 
come to have the beliefs (and feelings) prompted 
by participation in a war. To bring him to this 
point by verbal explanation may be very hard ( and 
to the extent that no one is up to doing it he 
will have to get into a war); it is clearly not 
enough to say "It was horrible" no matter how much 
feeling one may put into this sentence. There is 
more to war than being in some heartfelt but 
unspecified way horrible, and anyone who took himself 
to have grasped from that short sentence what war 
is like will be mistaken. It cannot be seen straight 
off from this what war is like; nor should we be 
encouraged to the thought that it can by any such 
irrelevant facts as that
(2*) Whenever I say that something is horrible 
it is because it reminds me of the smell 
of Mr. Kipling's Apple Pies.
The accidental truth of (2*) would be no defence
against the sceptic saying 'conclude what you like
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from your argument from analogy, but there’s no 
hiding the fact that for all you know your subject 
could be in any one of an enormous range of mental 
states *.
v’/hat we should have instead of (2') is something 
like this;
(2’’) Whenever I say that something is horrible 
there will be some explanation of that
utterance; and any explanation will have
in common with all the others some property 
that makes it clear why it is an explanation 
of the utterance. Such a common property 
will be connected with what it is for 
"X" is horrible" to have,the sense it 
has.
Two things should be clear. Being horrible has not 
got much to do with being able to remind people 
of the smell of apple pies, so (2*) is not an 
instance of (2**). Even if (2*) were true it would
be an accident that it was true.
Further, (2**) is nothing more than an instance 
of a more general claim that whenever anyone says 
that something is horrible there will be a number 
of possible explanations of a certain sort. We can, 
in a way, argue by analogy from (2**).
In the case of sayings that something is horrible 
we cannot see straight off why the subject has 
said that thing. The sceptic will’encourage us to 
think that in any given case there will be many 
possible explanations (and that we cannot know 
which is right). In the case of a man sobbing with
the pain of a broken arm this encouragement is 
rather misguided; but the identification of his 
sobbing as sobbing with the pain of a broken arm 
may just about be controversial or at least a 
little hard to see straight off. What was wrong 
with the argument from analogy was that it tried 
to get from what can be seen straight off to 
everything else, and that it used completely 
spurious means to do so. But we must note that 
there is nothing wrong when the argument is conducted 
along the lines of (2**); if something could explain 
a mental state or action of mine, it could also 
explain that mental state or action in others.
Four. Explaining Actions, and Some Remarks About 
Human Nature.
The position from which we start this section 
has been prepared by the two previous sections.
A brief summary may be in order.
A ’s mental state can prompt B*s belief that 
A is in that mental state via an action by A and 
a perception of B. 3*s perception is, we shall 
begin by saying, of A's action; and, depending 
on what B sees in the action, he can come to see 
something about A ’s mental state. .(If, for example, 
he sees that A is sobbing, he will see that A is 
unhappy; if he sees that A is sobbing in pain, he 
will see that A is in pain.) There will be several
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true descriptions of A's action (eg, sobbing, 
sobbing in pain, etc); some of them B will be able 
to see straight off as applying to the action. And, 
for most if not all of those descriptions, there 
will be several possible explanations of the action 
under that description. So B will not very often 
be able to see straight off what mental state A 
is in. (Sceptical remarks about the eternal possibility 
of pretence and the varieties of deception and 
mistake may make this more plausible than a quick 
glance around everyday life could do.)
So our problem is simple; how, if the ar.gument 
from analogy does not work, can B know what mental 
state A is in if he cannot see it straight off?
A's action may look like the gesture of a man in 
pain, or the struggle of a man who wants to put 
up a tent in a high wind, but is it really? (’What 
is B to think of his own perception of this opaque 
event?)
We have, in fact, already solved this problem.
For it arose earlier in the following disguise; A 
cannot see straight off what he is looking at, for 
what it is could be, as far as first glances can 
reveal, an orange tomato in a strange light, or 
a red tomato, or a number of other imaginative 
confusing alternative possibilities. The tomato may 
look like a red tomato but is it really?
Let us recall our solution to the difficulty 
of the tomato. We suggested that A would need to
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take some further observations, but that when he 
had done so we could ex'^lain his eventual decision 
about the colour of the tomato by citing those 
observations and a number of facts (facts (2) to
(4) of the last chapter) about how things of this 
or that colour look in this or that kind of light. 
These facts, which are instances of (P.5), are 
things that must be true if colour words are to 
have distinguishable senses.
We should expect the same solution to apply to 
our present problem of A ’s mental state. B will 
have to take some further observations, and we can 
explain his eventual decision about A ’s mental state 
by citing those observations and various facts 
about how people in this or that mental state look 
under this or that condition. These facts will be 
things that must be true if terms for mental states 
are to have clear senses.
It will be worth mentioning a few of these 
familiar and uncontroversial facts; I choose the 
easiest example, of pain. These facts will be along 
the lines of
(1) That X is in pain can prompt the belief 
that X is in pain (and the belief that X 
is pretending to be in pain, etc)
(2) That X is in pain but is being brave about 
it can prompt the belief'that X is in 
pain but is being brave about it ( and the 
belief that X is not in pain, etc)
(3) That X is pretending to be in pain can 
prompt the belief that X is pretending to
(01)
be in pain (and the belief that X is 
in pain, etc)
etc, etc.
This is the first part of the story. Next we 
need various facts to help us sort out, among the 
various possibilities that arise when B is prompted 
to the belief that A is in pain, which of them is 
true. We need, in that case, some facts about how 
A's mental state will look in, as it were, different 
lights; (I express these very roughly, and rather 
out of the general mould of the presentation of 
these facts)
(4) If X is brave, he will not be worried 
about having to go to the dentist, or 
travelling by air, etc
(5) If X is a con-man, he will run off when 
he sees a policeman, he will make feeble 
excuses to avoid going to a hospital, etc
etc, etc.
Finally, those such facts as (1) to (5) may 
be able to explain B's eventual belief that A 
really is in pain, other facts can help, and may 
be easier to use;
(6) If X is in pain there will be some reason 
(physical or medical) why he is in pain
(7) If X is brave there will be some reason 
(say, psychoanalytic) why he is brave
(8) If X is a con-man, there.’will be some reason 
(socio-historical...) why he is a con-man
etc, etc.
These things can fix the sense of A's mental
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just as well as can the things the mental state 
explains. Where the theorist finds the explanation 
of A's mental state insufficient to fix the sense 
of the description of the state, he can fix it from 
the other end by looking at the beliefs that the 
state can (via action) prompt; and vice versa, 
when he find the actions inconclusive he may be 
able to fix the sense of the description of the 
mental state by looking at the causal origins of 
that state.
Most descriptions of mental states are of the 
form "X /'s that p"; it will be a condition of 
that description having a sense both that there 
are facts that are conditions of having a sense,
and that there are facts that are conditions of 
"p" having a sense. Consider the description "X 
feels that he is in pain because his arm is broken"; 
it's essential to this description having a sense 
that when it is true various beliefs can be (via,, 
action, or 'directly') prompted. Among those beliefs 
will (in most cases) be the belief that X's arm 
is broken. So, as usual, that X's arm is broken 
will explain why his mental state is capable of 
prompting the beliefs it does prompt; to put it 
briefly, the broken arm prompts them (via X's feeling 
that he is in pain because his arm is broken). But 
then "X's arm is broken" must have a sense and 
fall under (P.5) as much as the description of 
X's feeling falls under (P.5).
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Much more could be said to fill out in more 
detail the nature and circumstances, and the things 
that are involved in our knowledge of other minds.
I am just going to concentrate on the one claim 
that I have been trying to make convincing; the 
claim that the truth of facts like (l) to (8) are 
conditions of our descriptions of mental states 
having the senses they have. (There must also be 
truths like (2) to (4) of the previous chapter, 
but we shall now leave these aside.)
(1) to (8) are a tiny part of a very rudimentary 
description of human nature. I shall defend this 
in a moment, but if it is true then we can say 
that our descriptions of mental states only have 
a sense if there is such a thing as human nature.
What must a description of human nature do?
A few obvious requirements can be loosely put as 
follows. It must say something about how people 
react to the world, with thoughts, feelings, action 
and so on that depend upon the particular situation 
they take themselves to be in. It must enable us 
to see those reactions in more interesting and 
revealing ways than we may have done at first sight. 
And it must connect where possible these reactions 
with, for want of a better word, the constitution 
of people.
An analogy may do for these hazy requirements 
what more careful expression should really be given 
the task of doing. A description of the nature of 
gold must describe the reactions of gold to its
immediate environment (light, acids, heat, etc), 
and must enable us to see those reactions in more 
interesting ways than first sight can see them.
(So the reactions are described in terms of the 
states of the outer electron shells of gold atoms, 
the Pauli exclusion principle, and so on.) Finally 
it must connect those reactions with the (atomic) 
constitution of gold.
Let us continue with this analogy for a little 
longer. There are compounds that look like gold 
and in many ways behave like gold, that are not gold. 
(Some tests, such as dissolution in Aqua Regia, give 
them away.) A description of the natures of these 
other compounds would describe the similarities of 
first sight in more interesting ways that would 
differ from the rediscriptions of those reactions 
in the case of gold itself.
Our ideas about the nature of things such as- 
gold both approximates to and depends on the true 
account of the nature of gold. For it is the nature 
of gold that gives samples of gold their properties, 
both the simple properties that first sight can 
detect and the deeper properties for which much 
investigation may be needed. Had gold no such nature, 
we could neither redescribe the obvious properties 
in less obvious ways, nor even find a principled 
way to distinguish gold from other similar materials. 
To put it Locke's way, if gold has a nominal essence 
it must have a real essence.
The rudimentary description of human nature 
stands in need of a deeper account, one by which 
we can redescribe the mental life of persons in more 
interesting ways. We do not have much idea how to 
do this, though many have tried; there are theories 
that would redescribe all our life as pursuit of 
a few basic drives, or as a conflict between the 
death-wish and the obsessions of the subconscious.
Such theories are, to put it mildly, over-simple; 
but they give expression to the belief that must 
be right that, since we can extrapolate from given 
experience of people’s reactions in certain situations 
to an understanding of new reactions in significantly 
different situations, something more general than 
the piecemeal account of human nature begun by (l) 
to (8) must be possible. Were there no such deeper 
account we could neither get very far with trying 
to redescribe the face values of what people are 
like, nor would there be any principled way of 
distinguishing people from other objects whose 
animations resemble those of people. As with gold, 
if people have a nominal essence, they must have a 
real essence ( whose description will be a task for 
the biological sciences).
I do not intend to reveal the shallowness of my 
own understanding of human nature-by trying to set 
out a deeper account than (1) to (8) could be a 
significant part of. I shall just make a couple of 
remarks about the account as I suppose it will in
the end start to be clear.
First, our present ideas about human nature, 
which may contain (l) to (8) and some rather deeper 
ideas than those, both approximate to and depend on 
the true account of human nature. For it is human 
nature as it interacts with the world that gives 
rise to the properties we observe in people and our 
speculations about human nature. So, to the extent 
that we can make sense of other people, that is, to 
the extent that our descriptions of their mental 
states have a sense, there must be something we can 
call human nature that explains our understandings 
and beliefs.
Secondly, I myself see no reason to expect that 
a theorist in possession of the true and deep account 
of human nature will be able to eliminate all 
uncertainty from his theorising about people. If 
a sceptic wants to put this point by saying that 
complete knowledge of another person is impossible, 
that will be a rather confusing way to say something 
quite simple.
The simple point is not just that knowledge of 
other people must be a product of what the deep 
account of human nature comes up with when it is 
fed a body of data too enormous for actual practise 
to handle. For even if this were true it would not 
be the point; and I doubt that a man's entire history 
will be relevant even to the nuances of the description 
of his present mental states. (It will clearly be 
part of the deeper account to make more precise
our present ideas about what in a m a n ’s biography 
will be relevant to his present states, to pick out, 
in other words, the salient features of our daily 
fantastically detailed experience.)
The point is rather this. To expect the account 
of human nature to be able to describe our lives 
and conduct in ways that make none of them exceptions 
to every rule is to be too hopeful (or, perhaps, 
too pessimistic). Some con-men do not run when they 
see a policeman. There may be a reason for this, 
such as this con-man’s arrogance or cool head, but 
surely there need not be any very good explanation 
of why he stands there. Perhaps running just does 
not occur to him; as it were, the rational process 
misses a beat, as it does when we are weak-willed 
or leap to distant conclusions, or whatever. There 
could be no fitting such exceptions to the rules 
under different rules that would make them the norm 
rather than the exception; rationality is not 
something we cannot occasionally abandon or be 
deserted by.
It is not, in this case, the sense of our 
description of the con-man*s action that is uncertain. 
We are not, for example, caught between saying that 
he is just standing there or saying that he is in 
some sense running on the spot. But I have chosen 
a clear case; in most cases where there is some 
uncertainty we will be unsure of the rationality 
and the description of the action or mental state.
(04)
That thoughts and actions can exemplify a less 
than perfect rationality makes this uncertainty 
possible. For rival theories of human nature 
will describe these thoughts and actions differently 
from time to time; and I doubt that there could 
be any way to assess or decide between these 
rival theories.
Clearly a theory that made us out to be too 
irrational too often would not do justice to the 
facts. But no theory of human nature could describe 
our experiences and conduct in a way that made 
rationality inescapable; the ideals of theory 
construction do not yield a unique solution to the 
problem of describing our experiences and conduct.
Here we arrive at a thought that may have 
motivated scepticism. Rather than show it does not 
support (3.4) by looking at further premisses, I 
shall attempt one clear statement of the thought, 
whose indépendance from (3.4) may be clear. Though 
there is such a thing as human nature, and though 
our descriptions of mental states do therefore 
have clear senses in the vast majority of cases 
and lend themselves to the construction of a theory 
of human nature, in some cases the descriptions 
may have no clear sense. There will in such cases 
be no fact of the matter whether Or not the 
description applies; human nature itself will in 
places fall under no clear description. At these 
points it is the very facts that give our words 
their senses that are the subject of controversy
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for which there is no remedy.
(This is an indeterminacy thesis of the kind 
advanced by Quine. The indeterminacy I allege, though, 
is nowhere near as drastic as that which Quine 
claimed to have detected; mine just pours a little 
cool water on over-enthusiastic obectivists.)
I end this long exploration of the problems of 
describing and explaining the experiences and 
conduct of sneakers with an improved version of
(R.3). (As always, past and even future points must
be allowed to adjust the senses of the slack 
expressions that follow.)
(R.3) Improved;
A semantic theory 0 for a language L
is adequate iff a theorist of L-speakers
is committed to 8 by a description of
L-speakers which is such that
(i) D describes the total experiences 
and conduct of L-speakers in the light 
of a theory H of human nature and a 
theory W of how the world as it engages 
with human nature was, and
(ii) H and W are governed by (P.4) and 
(P.5), and
(iii) there is no D ’ that describes the 
total experiences and conduct of L-speakers 
in the light of rival theories H ’ and W  
significantly better than D , and which 'is 
such that a theorist would be committed
by D' to a semantic theory Ô* that was 
significantly different from Q.
In the last chapter we will look at how further 
elucidation of our commitments should proceed.
Chanter Six. ’Realism’.
One. Introduction.
In this last chapter we will look over the 
progress, such as it is, that we have made with our 
understanding of commitment. Further extension 
of the project of describing those commitments 
will not be actually undertaken; I shall just say 
a few things about how the project is to be 
continued.
Two. The Commitments of Subject and Theorist;
A Summary and Restatement.
A theorist is committed to the existence of 
any object mentioned in an adequate semantic theory 
of a language Ig » where Lg is a language rich 
enough to be able to describe the experiences and 
conduct of speakers, and where what it is for a 
semantic theory for such a language to be adequate 
is given by (R.3) Improved.
We are only committed to a semantic theory 
for a language if that language can be used to say 
things (see Chapter Two). But a language can only 
be used to say things if the words of the language 
have senses; only if, we argued, there are a 
number of facts about human nature and how the world, 
as it impinges on human nature, is.
Further, if the language is to be capable of
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describing and explaining the experiences and 
conduct of speakers, it must be able to describe 
those things in the rich way that shows how human 
nature interacts with the world. It must, therefore, 
have the resources to state a theory of human 
nature and a theory of how the world is as it 
engages with human nature (theories governed by 
(p.5) and (P.4)) where those theories together 
enable description and explanation of the experiences 
and conduct of sneakers that is as good as possible.
These summar^T remarks are intended as a rather 
inexplicit argument for the conclusion that the 
semantic theory for the language of the theorist . 
must mention all the things that engage with human 
nature in the production of experience and conduct.
In other words
(R.l) Improved;
A semantic theory for a language L is 
adequate iff there is some description 
D of L-speakers which is such that
(i) I) describes the total experiences 
and conduct of L-speakers in the light 
of a theory H of human nature and a 
theory W of how the world as it engages 
with human nature was, and
(ii) H and W are governed by (P.4) and 
(P.5), and
(iii) there is no D* that describes the 
experiences and conduct of L-speakers
in the light of rival theories H ’ and W ’ 
significantly better than D
and the semantic theory for L mentions
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all the things mentioned by H and
(No doubt there are problems with this, not least 
that on the face of it false theories, or even 
theories having no pretence to be semantic theories 
could be called adequate by this new reauirement.
So even (R.l) Improved could stand some improvement; 
but I am only concerned with the insight that (R.l) 
Improved, as it stands, manages to express.)
It is clear that further elucidation of our 
commitments will consist in nothing less than coming 
up with a theory of human nature and a theory of 
how the world is as it interacts with human nature. 
That might have been expected; those not expecting 
it may be disappointed that no question has been 
begged yet. I am not going to embark on the further 
elucidation of our commitments; I shall only deploy 
some points from previous chapters to make a few 
remarks about how such elucidation must proceed.
Three. How Not to Believe in an Object.
We must expect that rival theories of human 
nature and the relevant world will disagree over 
what objects there are. It should not be forgotten 
that some theorists have played with the idea that 
there are not any objects at all, just a whirling 
of inexplicable ideas and impressions. What sort 
of thing can settle such disputes?
Suppose that one theorist believes in ghosts, 
and another does not think"that there are such
things. Problems arise for both sides.
For the theorist who does not believe in ghosts 
there is the problem of explaining what his opponent 
is prepared to describe as beliefs and thoughts and 
remarks about ghosts. For if ghosts do not exist 
then there cannot be beliefs or thoughts about 
ghosts; some other description and explanation of 
what look like beliefs and thoughts must be given.
I have already said that I do not really know 
what such an alternative description could be like. 
But there must be alternatives to the simple idea 
that whatever men have invented or dreamed or 
hallucinated must exist; it is my hope that ghosts 
are a good counterexample to this idea.
In his lectures, Gareth Evans developed a formal 
theory to account for such 'beliefs' by comparing 
them to make-believe, or pretence, and formulated 
a number of rules governing games of make-believe. 
The properties of the 'objects' of the game are 
results of stipulations that the rules capture.
(And I ’m sure i t ’s a good point for Evans’ theory 
that the ideas of pretence and agreement to sustain 
illusion arise so often in the accounts given by 
sceptics about our knowledge of other minds of our 
apparent communications.)
Something like Evans’ theory must be applied by 
the theorist who does, not believe in ghosts. He 
must attempt, without making essential use of the 
word "ghost" (which has no strict sense) to explain 
experiences and conduct that might be easiest to
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understand in terms of ghosts, perceptions of ghosts, 
and so on; and it will be a substantial thesis that 
he will have to defend that his account is not 
significantly worse than the account that 'speaks 
o f  ghosts.
For the theorist who does believe in ghosts 
there is a different problem. He must give some 
account of what it is that explanations of beliefs 
about ghosts have in common. This account will 
have to put a few cards on the table about what 
ghosts are like; that is, what the various kinds 
of ghost have in common, and what beliefs under 
what conditions they are essentially capable of 
prompting. Those who doubt that there are ghosts 
doubt exactly that there could be any such account.
It would be nice to be able to say something 
general about what would be wrong with the account. 
That would take us into many areas that are way 
beyond the scope of this thesis. A couple of timid 
and uncertain remarks will have to do what more 
careful thought would do much better.
First, it is unlikely that the account would 
be very rich. The properties assigned to ghosts 
are hardly more than those attributed to them by 
people w^ ho have claimed to see them. They are 
white and cloudy, perhaps they make witnesses 
think of dead people. ’/That is missing is what we 
have in the case of natural objects, namely the 
prospect of a deep understanding of the nature 
of ghosts in virtue of which they have these
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properties. The colour and -behaviour of gold is 
due to its constitution, and the colour and behaviour 
can be redescribed by a theory of the constitution 
of gold. In the case of ghosts no such theory is 
forthcoming; the whiteness of ghosts is nothing to 
do with the reflection of light (since they can 
shine in the darkest rooms) or even luminosity 
(since the whiteness does not fade). The whole 
idea that there is something there for us to 
investigate is dubious.
Secondly, though connectedly, there does not 
seem to be anything like the possibility of 
perceptual mistakes in the case of ghosts. Their 
shape (and whatever other properties they are 
meant to have) is not something people are said 
to be wrong about. A tall ghost one night can be 
short the next; if one seems to walk through a 
wall then it does. Nothing constrains what ghosts 
can and cannot do in a way that w^ould ever lead 
us to say that this ghost could not really have 
done what it seemed to do. The contrast between 
what we believe or feel like believing about the 
ghost and what is actually true of it is not a 
contrast there is a.ny way to draw. It is exactly 
as if the whole thing was a dream or a figment 
of someone’s imagination in which’he decides what 
is true of his ghost and that's that. There is 
no such thing as showing him evidence to the 
contrary; nothing is there to correct what would 
be mistakes.
These remarks gesture towards the need for 
an explanation of the relationship between our 
ordinary and incomplete and clumsy beliefs about 
objects and the scientific theories that set out 
to account for the world of which they are all a 
part. Those who believe in ghosts hover themselves 
between saying that science is irrelevant to the 
study of ghosts, and saying that one day science 
will advance to the point of understanding what 
ghosts are. The first of these alternatives seems 
to me much the worse of the two; for though, even 
if there are ghosts, we may not care much about 
what science has to say about them (any more than 
we are really interested in the nerves and so forth 
that conduct pain), science must have its say if 
ghosts are part of the world studied by science.
The second alternative is, as far as I know, just 
unsupported optimism produced by the belief in 
ghosts and a proper appreciation of the consequential 
right of science to investigate them.
Supressing gasps at oversimplification, let us 
describe controversy about existence as controversy 
about whether particular beliefs are akin to a game 
played, or a pretence or illusion sustained for some 
purpose, or whether those beliefs are prompted by 
things in the world whose scientific credentials 
may be pending.
One point is worth noting, and it will bring 
us to the problems with which the last sections will
deal. If I describe someone’s belief in a ghost 
as a kind of pretence, there is no suggestion that 
he will be aware of the pretence, or that the 
pretence was at any time deliberate or explicit.
It is just the fact that illusions are a bit like 
reality, and these pretences are at first sight, 
even to the pretender, just like real beliefs, that 
makes it so hard to restrict use of the word 
'belief* to things that really exist. For no doubt 
I myself use the word for things that do not really 
exist; to have a word without this defect would 
be to have a word based on a distinction we do not 
always know how to draw, namely the distinction 
between things that do and things that do not exist. 
In as much as we can draw the distinction we use 
it to avoid beliefs at all; for example, I avoid 
having beliefs about ghosts.
That is, even if it seemed to me that I had 
beliefs about ghosts, it would not follow from that 
that there are ghosts, or even that I have beliefs 
about ghosts. I might discover that the whole 
thing had been a game, like the game that begins 
with Santa Claus' sooty footprints by the fireplace 
but with the difference that no-one knew it was 
only a game.
As a theorist engaged in the construction of 
a theory of human nature and a theory of how the 
relevant world is, I must observe a number of 
cautions. These cautions are the subject of the 
last sections that follow; they are my attempt to
elucidate, with the help of points made in previous 
chapters, what it is to be a realist. I shall begin 
by looking at two standard accounts that I find 
unhelpful; then I shall begin my own account and 
suggest how it is to be continued.
Pour. Traditional Accounts of Realism.
The title of this section might give the idea 
that I am going to start digging up a lot of historical 
figures and their views of the world. There would 
be plenty of material; the distinction between 
illusion or appearance and reality has been much 
sought after. Frustration and the difficulties of 
drawing the distinction properly have led some to 
deny the existence of reality, and others to deny 
that there are appearances. Others have drawn the 
distinction in roughly the right place but with 
hopeless materials.
I shall just look quickly at two fairly m o d e m  
accounts of what realism is. One we have already 
mentioned; as it is usually stated it is that the 
(real) world may be such that sentences about it 
may be true (or false) independantly of our ability , 
to verify (or falsify) that sentence. The second 
account is roughly this; to be a realist about 
X (eg, cats, blueness, numbers, necessity, etc) is 
to use the word "X" in explanations of beliefs about 
X's.
Neither of these accounts strike me as being
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very helpful. And I shall quickly try to say why; 
the points I shall make are not intended to deny 
the claims they make, but to help us find where to 
look for a better understanding of realism.
About the first account, which has been the 
pivot of most recent realist-antirealist debates, 
there are several points to make.
First, it’s notable that the best cases of 
undecidability are in science and mathematics; areas 
where undecidability has nothing to do with hLiman 
nature and our limited endowment of capacities to 
check things and everything to do with conceptual 
limits and matters of principle. The discoveries • 
of Heisenberg and whoever it was that proved the 
undecidability in Peano arithmetic of Goldbach's 
conjecture must be taken as discoveries about 
the fundamental particles of physics and about 
the objects of mathematics. Even if we are sensible 
and avoid the nonsenses of hidden variables in 
physics or platonic entities in mathematics, we are 
hardly giving up realism in these fields; rather 
we are just discovering what realism comes down to 
in these cases.
Secondly, the other cases of undecidability, 
such as sentences about the irrecoverable past, 
which have everything to do with human nature and 
our limits, are likewise irrelevant to the fact 
that we are realists about the past. Suppose there 
was a complete record of the past; would this make 
us worry that there was nothing we could not know
0^about the past? And why should the fact that there 
are some things we cannot know about the past make 
us any more realist than we would otherwise be 
about those things?
As I say, I am not denying that there are things 
that we here and now cannot know. But if there were 
not what difference would it make? Suppose a decent 
theory of meaning could be built on the basic notion 
of verifiability or justified assertion; surely both 
these ideas already have the idea, of reality in them. 
(To verify something is to verify something about 
the world; what, if anything, justifies an assertion, 
is how the world is;' knowledge is knowledge of the 
world; and so on.)
The last, and I think most pertinent criticism 
of our first account is that it offers no prospect 
of an elucidation of the distinction between appearance 
and reality. Looking just at things we can"know, 
we always find this distinction to be drawn. A 
tomato can look orange, a stick in water can look 
bent, and so on; and if arguments from previous 
chapters were to be repeated here, we would recall 
that it's essential to "the tomato is orange"'s 
having a sense that there are various facts that 
can explain our knowledge that the tomato is orange. 
What, if anything, goes wrong with our investigations 
is only that we may be unable to take all the 
necessary observations. But otherwise we can draw 
the distinction between appearance and reality in 
the right place. Where we cannot complete a particular •
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investigation we will not be able to draw this 
distinction; but surely this inability is just 
the opposite of what the realist is concerned with 
though he must acknowledge it where necessary.
In short, the contrast between truths that 
can and truths that cannot obtain independantly 
of our capacities for knowledge is nothing to do 
with the contrast between appearance and reality. 
For where there is the first contrast we are 
unable to draw the second; and where there is not 
the first we can still, and are most interested to 
draw the second.
The second account has been less discussed. 
Again, I do not wish to argue against it, but to 
say that this too is a poor elucidation of what 
realism is.
The remarks have already been made, but we 
shall make them again in a clearer fashion than 
before. First, and a little impertinently, it is 
not necessary to belief in, say, rust, to use the 
word "rust" in explanations of beliefs about rust. 
"Iron oxide" will do just as well. I make this 
point only because replies to it smuggle in the 
idea of realism; it will be said that rust and 
iron oxide are the same thing and can prompt the • 
same beliefs. And if we ask why 'both' rust and 
iron oxide (the evening star and the morning star, 
etc) prompt the same beliefs, the answer must be 
that we have discovered that they are the same.
But surely the ideas of 'thing', and of discovery.
are going to be much more useful in an account 
of realism than some remark about using a word 
again.
The second remark mag make this even clearer.
As we have noted it is not enough to use a word 
again in the explanation of what may or may not 
really be beliefs to guarantee that there is 
something of which you speak and about which you 
defend unspecified realist theses. To explain a 
child's belief about Santa Glaus by saying that 
Santa drank the milk or left the footprints is 
neither to explain a belief nor to be involved in 
any realist theses 'about Santa Claus'. There are 
no theses to be held about things that do not 
exist.
And this leads us to repeat an earlier criticism 
again. It may well be that ghosts do not exist. My 
pretending to say or believe things about ghosts 
is no obstruction to this possibility. So how, 
again, are we to draw the contrast between appearance 
and reality? It certainly may seem to me that I'm 
saying and believing things about ghosts but am 
I really? Am I really using a word with any meaning 
when I explain someone's belief (if it is a belief) 
by saying "There was a ghost there"?
The moral I draw is that the account of what 
realism is, or what it is to be a realist, must be 
drawn from within. If I want to be a realist, there 
must be something I can do and know I'm doing; it 
should even be possible to be a realist about ghosts.
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as many people still are. An account of realism 
that does not both enable people to see a point 
in being realists (or antirealists) and enable them 
to know that they are on the side they want to 
be on, is not a distinction that accounts for 
the vehemence with which disputes between the two 
sides have raged. But the first ’traditional account’ 
is not one there is often any point in looking at, 
for realism and antirealism coincide; and the 
second accoiont does not often permit people to 
know whether or not they are being realists about 
what they want to be realists about.
Five. Being a Realist.
Let us look at a simple case. Suppose I have 
a perception I ’m inclined to describe as a perception 
of a red tomato. I ’m prompted by something to the 
belief that there is a red tomato.
It must be philosophy’s most well-worn point 
that there can be several explanations of this 
belief. It may look to me like there’s a red tomato 
but there may not be. There is a difference between 
appearance and reality.
To be a realist is first and foremost to accept 
this. It is to accept that the-world is not whatever 
one feels like saying it is.
Secondly, I am not forced to classify all my 
perceptions as mere appearances. Investigation 
can settle the matter for me. For even if there is 
not a red tomato there, something is
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responsible for my mental state, and, whatever it 
is, it is there for me to scrutinise and to prompt 
me to less impulsive beliefs than the one that first 
crossed my mind.
If the tomato is really there, then a number 
of facts that give the word "tomato" a sense will 
be involved in explaining how I come to know that.
If it's not there then I must be guided by my 
understanding of the alternative possibilities to 
a proper knowledge of what I see.
To be a realist is, secondly, to believe that 
the words we use have their roots in facts about 
the world that engages with human nature. And it , 
is to believe that those facts are such that the 
investigation of the world as it engages with us 
is possible.
People who seriously believe in ghosts are 
realists in these first two ways. They do not hold 
that any old perception can be a perception of a 
ghost however much the observer insists it was.
For they hold that there are facts about ghosts 
and that we can know about them (if "ghost” means 
anything this must be right). Ghosts are, of 
course, nervous and elusive, but there is meant to 
be the possibility of an investigation that would 
settle whether or not something.was a-ghost.
Whits linen flapping on a line is definitely not 
a ghost, though we may be unsure exactly what a 
ghost is or how to establish that we have seen a 
genuine ghost.
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Let us pause to make a couple of clarificatory 
points. First, the things I say are part of what 
it is to be a realist about something are quite 
consistent. There is no need for someone who accepts 
that there will always be alternative explanations 
of a more or less bizarre sort to the one he thinks 
of first to go on to doubt that he can ever know 
which of them is true. Quite the reverse; if we 
have an interest in the difference between appearance 
and reality the distinction must be one that we 
believe can be drawn where we can see it.
Phenomenalist accounts of the world suffer from 
the defect that they do not make room for the 
possibility of investigation. Truths about the 
world are meant to be expressible entirely in terms 
of the things that we can see straight off (that 
this object is or looks blue/square/etc). Beliefs 
enriched by theory play no role in description 
of the world. But it’s central to the realism I 
would describe that there can be more to be said 
about an object than the first thing that leaps 
to mind; there is no reason to expect that an 
observer will be prompted to every possible belief 
by what he sees. (Nor is there any support for the 
idea that what we do not know about or notice 
cannot be part of our experience; as Michael Frayn 
observed, it's no good keeping yourself in deliberate 
ignorance of such things as mortgages and impregnation 
in the hope that if you don't know what these things
are they won't or can't happen to you.)
Secondly, it will be noticed that the points 
now being assembled into a description of realism 
are all stolen from out account of the explanation 
of belief. It may be a surprise to discover that 
realism is slowly and in a rather underhand manner 
being equated with rationality in belief; and the 
development of this thought into the claim that it 
is possible to be realist about ghosts but not for 
long may be predicted. Actually I am not going to 
supply that development.
The difficulty we now find ourselves in is that 
what we said about the explanation of belief is 
going to run out quite soon, and our description 
of realism is going to run dry. I add just two 
further points.
First, in a way in which this thesis has done 
little or nothing to explain, the senses of words 
depend on the possibility of rich theories of the 
phenomena they describe. We have noted two cases 
of this; the conditions under which a thing.looks 
red have in common something best explained in 
terms of the kind of light reflected under the 
various conditions that rival to explain an object's 
looking red; and, the possibility of a principled 
way of distinguishing gold from other apparently 
similar substances depends on the possibility of 
redescribing the behaviour of gold in scientific 
terms. Such scientific theories may play no role 
in the explanations themselves of belief; but the
possibility of such explanations depends on the 
possibility of such theories.
Secondly, as we have tried to make clear (at 
the end of the last chapter) there is no real 
expectation that indeterminacy can be avoided.
There is no sure-fire way to get from the beliefs 
that leap to mind to a unique richer description 
of the phenomena. This observation, now dimly 
invoked, is responsible for the insertion of the 
phrase 'up to a point' in the account of realism 
that follows.
To be a realist is to accept that
(i) there will always be at least two possible
explanations of a belief, at least one of 
which will not count that belief as 
knowledge
(ii) it is always, up to a point, possible to 
check by investigation the truth or 
falsity of the belief
(iii) it is very rare that an experience will 
prompt straight off all the beliefs it 
is capable of prompting
(iv) where there is something that can be known
by observation there is something that
science will say about the same object
or event or phenomenon.
As I have said, a better understanding of how 
beliefs can be explained will improve and extend this 
list. When we understand as well as we can what 
realism is, we can set out, as realists, to discover 
the objects to which we are committed by the theory 
of human nature and the theory of the world as it
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engages with human nature.
It is not envisaged that this project can be 
carried very far by men sitting in armchairs or 
typing away at tables. The investigations involved 
in the verification of beliefs is not in any 
large part likely to be a conceptual investigation.
To some extent it may be; and even where it is 
not it may be that philosophy has a contribution 
to make. But thought is never a substitute for 
experience, and those interested in truth and 
knowledge and the rest will in the end have to 
make do with the philosophy of the day and deploy 
it as best it can be deployed in the processing 
of experience. Some revision of that philosophy 
will probably be inevitable, but only dissatisfaction 




Preface. Works that have exerted a fairly continuous 
influence on the thesis should be mentioned first.
They are McDowell (38), from whom I take the phrase 
'making sense of sneakers', Wiggins (60) to (63),
Bvans (15) and (16) and Wittgenstein (65) to (67).
Chanter One.
1; On commitment generally, see Quine (50) and (51).
2; The thought and language controversy; the position 
I attack is sometimes known as the Whorf-Sapir hypothesis 
See Whorf (68) and Davidson (7) in which the 'cliche' 
is noted. On my side see Wittgenstein (65) and Cromer 
in Foss (20).
3; The problems of intensional contexts have been 
widely and unsatisfactorily treated. Generally, see 
Frege (21) and Dummett (13) Ch.5, Quine (52), Davidson 
(10) and Wallace (56). For a theory in the Fregean 
tradition that does not work, see Kaplan (3-1). For 
complications with Quine's and Davidson's theory, see 
Hornsby (29) and Loar (37); finally McDowell (41) 
for the force of the bewitchment produced by the 
problems of opacity.
For the ideas behind a correct account, see Evans 
(16) and (17). Those worried by all the substitutional 
quantifiers in my semantics should see Kripke (36).
4; For some help with problems of non-denoting terms, 
see notes to Chapter Six.
Chanter Two.
1; The idea, eventually dropped, behind (R.l) comes 
from the first sentence of McDowell (3#).
2; On radical interpretation, see McDowell (38) and (39), 
the introduction to Evans and McDowell (19), Wiggins
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(61) to (63), and McGinn (44), Grandy (22) and Evans 
(16) on the Principle of Charity. The original sources 
are Quine (50) Ch. 2, and Davidson (6).
3; For translational theories, see Katz (32). For 
objections to translational and list theories, see 
Evans (15) and the introduction to Evans and McDowell 
(19).
4; Formal theories are to be found in Tarski (55),
Frege (21); for the application of these theories 
see Davidson (5), McDowell (55) and Evans (19) section 
one. Criticisms occur in Dummett (13)'s chapter on 
defining tru.th, and (14) and Kripke (36).
5; The syntacticians I have in mind can be found in 
Seuren (53), Davidson and Harman (11) and Steinberg 
and Jacobovits (54). The claim that syntax is an 
independant discipline was made most strongly by 
Chomsky (4) part one.
6; The idea for the method by which constraints on 
semantic theories are derived comes from Wiggins (63).
7; It is just worth pointing out that the references 
to theorems in the axioms of the first two .-chapters 
are to theorems, and not just any logical consequence 
of a theory is a theorem (see (R.2)). This not only 
prevents unhelpful objections; it answers the difficulty 
posed by Foster and Loar (see introduction to Evans 
and McDowell (19)). For a language with intensional 
operators that had Foster-type 'theorems' as theorems 
would contain false consequences.
8; On the place of a theory of truth in semantics, 
and other ingredients of a semantic theory, see 
Wiggins (64) and Evans (17).
Chapter Three.
1; On explanation, and the paradoxes of confirmation, 
see Hempel (27). Harman's article, from which (P.2) 
derives, is (24); the ideas here are developed further 
in Harman (25).
2; The subjectivism to which the example of section 
three is addressed is criticised by Warnock (59), 
Kolnai (34), and Wiggins (62). The argument of this 
section is my attempt to understand Wiggins’ claim 
that "The possibility does not exist for the theorist 
to stand back from the language of his subjects”.
I am indebted here to Wiggins' lectures.
3; Readers may agree with me that (P.4^ is not quite 
right. (Some difficulties are located in Chapter Five, 
section two.) The principle works much better for 
explanations of knowledge than explanations of belief. 
But the shortcomings of this principle do not affect 
the arguments that depend on it, which are concerned 
with knowledge.
Chanter Four.
1; The literature on these subjects is large and 
uniformly poor. For a selection of confusing and 
unconvincing articles, see Pitcher (47), Jones (30), 
Klemke (33), Chappell (3) and Gustafson (23).
Modern treatments are hardly better; see Blackburn
(2) and, as good as anything but still with some 
mistakes Hopkins (28).
Original sources are Wittgenstein (65) to (67) 
and Austin's brilliant (l); these works are exempt 
from the despair evoked by the selections above.
2; On colour, see Harrison (26) and any decent 
encyclopaedia (turn to 'Colour').
3; The basis for the analysis of 'looks' in section 
six is Austin's treatment in (1) and Wittgenstein's 
discussion of 'seeing as' in (65).
Chapter Five.
1; On causal theories of perception and action see 
Davidson (8) and (9), Peacocke (45). (Also Wggins 
on weakness of will, Aristotelian Society 1979, and 
Hornsby 'Actions', RKP 19^0.)
2; -The treatments of gold and human nature derive
from Putnam (49) and Kripke (35); see especially 
Wiggins (60) Chapters three and six, especially 
longer note 6.36.
3; Quine’s indeterminacy thesis can be found in 
Quine (50) ch. 2, and (51); the renly is made by 
Evans (15).
Chapter Six.
1; Until Evans' theory of vacuous names is published 
we will have to make do with some of the papers that 
he drew on in the construction of the theory, in 
particular Walton (57) and (58).
2; On the connections between beliefs and science 
see Wiggins (60) chapters three to five, and Wiggins
(62) section IX.
3; The first traditional account of realism is 
largely due to Dummett (14) and (13); it has been 
contested by McDowell (39) and (42.) and (38) and 
McGinn (43) that this kind of antirealism will not 
stand up. See also Wiggins (63). The second so-called 
traditional account is Peacocke's (46). Much more 
interesting are Austin's remahks in (l).
4; The account given of realism would be much better 
for incorporating Evans' points about the understanding 
of demonstratives,in his lectures. (I dp not have my 
notes on those lectures to hand.) For the moment, 
see Evans (16) and Walton (57)and (58); compare, for 
example, the elucidation of realism with Walton's 
remark "It is not understood (in a game of mud-pies). 
that if a glob is 40^ clay then make-believedly a 
pie is 40^ clay" etc, Walton (57) p.11.
5; Self-styled realists should observe that even if 
they are right that this or that belief is just part 
of a game or pretence, the game or pretence is not 
necessarily pointless or without value. See Walton
(57) section VI; fiction is important too. (Though 
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